Completing Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., and Resolving the Oddity and Lingering Questions of Civil RICO Statute of Limitations Accrual by Mumford, Marcus R.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1998 | Issue 3 Article 7
9-1-1998
Completing Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., and
Resolving the Oddity and Lingering Questions of
Civil RICO Statute of Limitations Accrual
Marcus R. Mumford
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marcus R. Mumford, Completing Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., and Resolving the Oddity and Lingering Questions of Civil RICO Statute of
Limitations Accrual, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 1273 (1998).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1998/iss3/7
1. Ra cket eer  Influenced an d Corru pt Orga nizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(199 4).  RICO pr ovides pla int iffs with  a civil tr eble-da ma ge re med y. S ee 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964.  The  Supreme  Cour t , i n  Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff  & Associates, 483
U.S. 143, 155 (1987), noted  th at  a “gener al ‘cat chall’ feder al [five-year ] crimina l
s t a tu t e of limitat ions” applies in criminal pr osecutions un der RICO.
2. S ee Klehr  v. A.O. Smith  Corp., 117 S. Ct . 1984, 1996 (1997) (Scalia , J .,
concur r ing in  pa rt  an d con cur ri ng  in  th e ju dgm en t).
3. S ee Malley-Duff, 483  U.S . at  156 (s ele ctin g th e “4-yea r s ta tu te  of lim ita tion s
for  Clayton Act actions, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b), [a s] t he  mos t a ppr opr iat e lim ita tion s pe ri od
for  RICO a ctions ”). E a r lier, the Court n oted that “Congress’ failure to enact [a statute
of limita tions ] cannot  be rea d as a  rejection  of a uniform  federa l sta tute of
limit at ions.” Id . at  155. 
4. S ee id . at 156-57 (explain ing tha t it “[had] no occasion to decide the
appropr ia t e ti me  of acc ru al ”).
5. S ee A Circuit-by-Circuit Analysis of th e S ta tu te’s Mos t L iti gat ed I ssu es, CIVIL
RICO  REPORT ’S  COURT WATCH, Aug. 1997, at  21 (providing a  ta ble of circuit-by-circuit
an alys is of RICO’s st at ut e of limita tion s issu e). S ee d is cuss ion  infra  Par t II.B. A
detailed  ana lysis of each circuit’s rule lies beyond the scope of this Note. Oth er
commenta tor s have delineat ed four or five different  rules  f ro m  t h e federal court cases.
S ee Klehr, 117  S. C t.  at  199 4 n .1 (S cal ia , J ., con cur r ing  in  pa r t  and concur r ing  in  the
judgmen t ) (“[T]here is a four th  accru al r ule—th e Clayt on Act ‘injur y’ ru le.”); Edwin
Scot t  Ha cken ber g, Comm ent , All the Myriad  Ways: Accrual of Civil RICO Cl aims in
t h e Wake of Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff, 48 LA. L. RE V. 1411, 1413 (1988)
(“[F ]our  lin es of a ut hor ity  re gar din g civil R ICO  accr ua l ha ve e me rg ed .  . . .”); Pa ul
B. O’Neill, “Mot her  of M ercy, I s T hi s th e Begi nn in g of R ICO ?”: Th e Prop er Poin t of
Accrual of a P riv ate C ivi l R ICO  Act ion , 65  N .Y.U. L. RE V. 172, 195-96 (1990)
(recognizing  five existin g ru les). See also infra note  13 (suggest ing a  different  ru le
migh t  be n ece ss ar y in  RI CO co ns pir acy  cas es ).
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Complet ing Klehr v. A.O. Sm ith Corp., and
Resolvin g t he Odd it y a nd L in ger in g Ques t ion s of
Civil RICO Sta tu te of L im it a t ion s Accr ua l
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 Civil RICO1 was  left “limita t ions -naked”2 when  ena cted by
Congress in 1970, and rem a ined t ha t wa y unt il the Su prem e
Cou r t  clothed  th e st at ut e wit h  a  four -year  s t a tu te of l imi ta t ions
per iod in  a  1987 case, Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Associates.3  Bu t  the Malley-Duff Court  did not det erm ine when
tha t  lim it a t ion s p er iod  sh ould  begin  to run .4 In  the wake of the
Malley-Duff decision, t he fed era l court s delin eated esse nt ially
th ree  conflicting ru les for civil RICO  st a tu te  of l imi ta t ions  ac-
crua l .5 Thus,  for  over ten  years, RICO litigants ha ve been ask-
ing: When does th e civil RICO stat ut e of limita tions a ccru e?
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6. 117 S. C t.  198 4 (19 97).
7. S ee David  F. P ike, U.S . Su prem e Court to H ear Argu m ent s  on  when
Li m ita tion  Period Run s on RICO , L. A. DAILY J ., Apr . 21, 1 997,  at  4 (exp lai nin g h ow
the Suprem e Court, after it h eard ar gumen t s  in  Grimmet t  v . Brown , 75 F.3d 506 (9th
Cir . 1996), dismissed tha t case be ca use  sett lemen t a nd pr ocedura l problem s ma de it
moot , bu t t he n g ra nt ed r evie w t o Klehr,  “appa ren t ly eage r  t o s e t t le a t hr ee-way sp lit
in  the federa l circuit s”). Many exp ected  th e Cour t t o resolve  th e conflict. S ee Michael
J . Mu elle r, K leh r v . A.O. S mi th  Cor p.: When Will We Learn the Accrual Ru le for Civil
RICO?, RICO  L. RE P ., J ul. 199 7, at  8, 8.
8. Kleh r , 117 S. Ct. a t 1995 (Scalia , J., concur rin g in pa rt  an d concur rin g in
the ju dgm en t).
9. Id . a t  199 4 (Sca lia , J ., con cur ri ng  in  pa rt  an d con cur ri ng  in  th e ju dgm en t).
10. S ee O’Neill, supra no te 5 , a t  190; J udge  David  B. Sen telle , Civ i l R ICO: The
J ud ges’ Perspective, and S ome Notes on Practice for North Carolina Law yers, 12
CAMPBELL  L. RE V. 145, 167-68 (1990 ) (citing Un ited  Sta tes  v. Kubrick, 444  U.S. 111,
117 (197 9)).
Many an ticipated  th e Supr eme Cour t would a nswer  t h is
linger ing ques t ion  in  Klehr v. A.O. S m ith Corp.,6 a d ecision
ha nded  down  a  li t t le  more than  a  week  before  the Cour t  t ook  it s
1997 summ er recess.7 Bu t  in st ea d of a nsw er in g t he ques t ion
a n d res olving th e conflict, th e Cour t in  Klehr merely s t ruck
down the Thir d C ir cu it ’s “la st  pr ed ica te a ct” rule.8 And  so “the
qu est ion,” J ust ice S ca lia  poin t ed out in  his concurren ce,
“rema in[ed ] un an swer ed.”9
The differing a ccru al ru les th at  ha ve developed s ince
Malley-Duff r efle ct  t h e ten sions inh eren t in  th e civil RICO
lim it a t ion s per iod issue. Although  th e Klehr Court  gave an
in dica t ion  of how it  wou ld  res olve  thes e t en sions,  it  left  more
ques t ions lingering about an  acceptable rule than it an swered.
This  Note  answers  those  l ingerin g ques t ions  and  uses  the
reason ing of Klehr to est ablis h  a n  ana lyt i ca l  framework  for  an
accept able  RICO statu te of limitations accrua l rule. Part II of
th is  Not e gives  a  ba ckgr ound to the RICO s ta tu te of limit a t ion s
issue and lays out  th e compet ing circuit ru les th at  developed
after  Malley-Duff.  Part III examines Klehr, spe cifically t he
na tu re of th e petit ioners’ RICO cla im and  the Cour t ’s  r eason ing
in  its  reject ion of the T hir d Cir cuit ’s “last  predicat e act” rule.
Pa rt  IV ana lyzes th e Klehr decision a ccord ing to the  under ly ing
prin ciples of a s t a t u te of limit at ions, n am ely “recovery” an d
“repose,”10 an d u ses t he Cou rt ’s r eas oning t o resolve th e
ques t ions tha t  th e M alley-Duff and Klehr Cour ts  left lin ger ing.
Pa r t  V lays ou t  a  fina l accrua l  ru le  tha t  comple tes  what  the
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11. S ee 18 U .S. C. § 1 962 (a)-(d ) (199 4).
12. 18 U.S .C. § 19 64(c) (199 4); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994) (definin g
racke teer ing act ivit ies  to i ncl ud e offen se s s uch  as m ur der, k idna ping, ga mblin g, a r son ,
robber y, briber y, extort ion, an d th rea ts t o commit a ny of the  above, as  well as  o t h er
a c tivities alrea dy criminalized elsewh ere in t he U.S. Code, such a s ma il and wir e
f r aud , em bez zle me nt , a nd  obs tr uct in g fed er al  in ves ti ga ti on s).
13. Under  th e con spi ra cy pr ovisi on,  18 U .S. C. § 1 962 (d) (19 94),  a p la in ti ff ma y
conceivably be  in jured under  RICO before the  pa tt e rn  e lemen t  is  s a t is fi ed  and
the re fo re re cover  for h er dam ages. This injury-before-patter n nu ance distinguish es
som e conspiracy claims from t he m ore common RICO claims u nder  18 U.S.C.
§ 1962 (a)-(c), wh er ein  th e pl ain tiff ca nn ot h ave  su ffere d a  viola tion  of civil RICO un til
t he pat ter n elem ent  ha s been  sat isfied. This N ote, on st at ut e of limita tion s accru al,
addresses  only th ose more comm on subst ant ive violations of RICO under  18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a)-(c). S ee d is cuss ion  infra  Pa rt  IV. An an alysis of whe n t he four -year civil
RICO sta tu te of limit at ions sh ould accru e in consp ira cy claims lies beyond the scope
of this Note, but  the t opic is treat ed at  lengt h in  Ellen  J an cko-Bake n, N ote, When
Will the Idling S tatute of Limitat ions St art  Run ning in R ICO Conspiracy Cases?, 10
CARDO ZO L. RE V. 2167, 2189 (1989) (arguin g th a t  the s tat ute of limitat ions in RICO
cons pir acy  cases should begin run ning not, as t he  F if th  C ircu it  has  he ld , when  the
objectives of the conspiracy have been a ccomplished or rea lized,  bu t  when  the
de fendan t ’s own agr eeme nt  ha s ter min at ed, like t ra dit ion al  consp ira cy law (refut ing
United  Stat es v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cert . d eni ed , 439 U.S. 953
(197 8))).
14. S ee G. Rober t Bla key & S cott D. C essa r, Equita ble Relief  Under Civil RICO:
R eflect ion s on Religious Tech nology Cent er v. Woller she im:  Will Civil RICO be
Effect ive Onl y A gai ns t W hi te-Col lar  Cri m e?, 62 NOTRE  DA M E  L. RE V. 526 app . B  a t
Supreme Cour t  s t a r t ed  in  Malley-Duff in a ccord an ce with
limit at ions “first  pr inciple s,” Klehr, and civil RICO.
II. BA CK G R OU N D
A. R ICO’s Develop m ent
 The subs tantive provisions of RICO, cont ained  in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a )-(d), pr ohibit : (a) inves tin g m onies  ea rned th rough  a
pa t t ern  of racket eer ing in  a n  enterprise engaged in intersta te
comm erce; (b ) acqu ir ing an  in teres t , th rough  a  pa t t ern  of
racket eer ing,  in an  ent erpr ise engaged in  inter sta te commer ce;
(c) conduct in g t he a ffa ir s,  th rough  a  pa t t er n  of racket eer in g, of
an  ent erp ris e en gaged  in  inter sta te commer ce; or (d) cons pir ing
to violate a ny of th e above proh ibitions.11 The RICO s t a tu t e
provides a  p r iva te civil action by which plain tiffs may recover
tr eble dam a g es a nd a t torney’s fees for  in ju ry “by r ea son  of a
viola t ion  of” these su bst an tive  provisions.12 The e lemen t s  t ha t  a
RICO plaintiff needs to allege in a claim are essen t i a ll y the
same u n der  a ll t he p rovis ion s,  exce pt  for  the con sp ir acy
proh ibi t ion .13 For  an  18 U.S .C. § 1962(c) cau se of act ion, t he
most comm only used pr ohibi t ion ,14 a civil RICO plaintiff must
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619 (1987) (reporting t hat  in 1985 and  1986, on average 92.5% of civil RICO claim s
cited to § 1 962(c)); s ee also A.B.A. SECTION  O F  CORPORATE , BANKING & BU S I N E S S  LAW ,
REPORT  O F  T H E  AD H OC CIV I L RICO TASK F ORCE  55 (1984) (97% of all civil RICO
ac tions we re  br ou gh t u nd er  18 U .S. C. § 1 962 (c)).
15. S ee Grimm ett v. Brown , 75 F.3d 506, 510 (9 t h  Cir. 199 6), cert . gra nt ed , 116
S. Ct. 252 1 (1996), cert. dismiss ed a s im prov id ent ly g ran ted , 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997)
(citing 18 U.S .C. §§ 1964(c), 1962(c); Sedim a, S.P .R.L. v. Imr ex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496
(198 5)).
16. Orga nized Crime Cont rol Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat . 922, 923
(1970) (st at em en t of fi nd in gs a nd  pu rp ose ).
17. S ee Robert  E. Wood, Civil RICO— Lim itations in Lim bo, 21 WILLAMETTE  L.
RE V. 683, 684  (198 5).
18. S ee O’Neill, supra  not e 5, at  181. 
19. S ee id . at 180-182. But see Dougla s E. Abr am s, Crim e Legislation and  the
Public Interest: Lessons from Civ il RICO , 50 SMU  L. RE V. 33, 36 (1996) (“If Congress
had debated  civil RICO dis pass iona tely,  the  lawmakers might  have  an t ic ipa ted tha t
the p r iv a t e rem edy would h ave lit tle or n o effect on the  fight a gain st or gan ized crim e
and r acke teer ing.  How many ‘p r i va t e  a t torneys  gene ra l’ wou ld have the  t emer ity  to
sue or ga ni zed  cri me  me mb er s a nd  ra cke te er s in  ope n co ur t for  tr ebl e d am ag es ?”).
20. S ee Abra ms , supra  no t e 19,  a t  51  (sugges t ing  tha t  RICO wen t unn oticed in
pa r t becau se of its pla cemen t in  Title 18 of the U .S. Code, not a place “lawyers
ordin ar ily . . . con sult  in se ar ch of priva te r eme dies”). See also Mary S. Hu mes, Note,
RICO  and a Un iform Rule of Accrual, 99 YALE L.J . 139 9, 1 399  n. 5 (19 90).
Cr imina l RI CO t hr ea te ns  de fen da nt s w it h m an da tor y for feiture p rovisions and a
threa t of imprisonment a nd/or fines, while civil RICO th rea t ens  defendan t s  wi th
tr eble dam ages a nd a tt orne y fees provision s. As one m ay im agin e, both of these
remedia l an d pu nit ive re med ies h ave cr eat ed cont rover sy. Th e  s u bst an tiv e pr ovisi ons
of th e two RICO  featu res  rem ain  th e sam e, but  th ey differ in m an y wa y s t h a t  one
m igh t  expect a  crimin al a ction t o differ from a civil act ion, procedu ra lly and
subs ta nt ively. On t he st at ut e of limita tions  issu e, however , an  observer  ma y find th eir
differences  counterint uitive. For example, criminal RICO prosec u t ions apply a five-
alle ge a ll of t he follow in g: “(1) cond uct  (2) of an  ent erpr ise (3)
th rough a  pa t t ern  (4 ) of racket eer ing act ivi ty (known as
‘p red ica t e act s’) (5) caus in g  in jur y to th e pla int iff’s ‘business or
pr oper ty.’”15
The pur poses of RICO ar e well docum ent ed. RICO provides
“enh an ced san ctions an d new r emedies t o deal wit h t he
un lawfu l activities of those engaged in or gan ized cr ime .”16
While  RICO was pr imar ily conceived as a  crimina l sta tu te, 17
Congress inclu ded  th e civil rem edy p rovisi on  t o hold v iol a tor s
fina ncia lly res pons ible t o t he bu sin ess es t he y ha rm ,18 t o
encourage pr ivat e attorneys general enforcement actions and,
u l t imately, to curb organ ized crime’s expan sion into th e spher e
of legitimat e comm ercial ent erpr ise.19 Wh ile  pr ose cutor s bega n
us ing RICO’s enh an ced crimin al san ctions with in a few year s
after  its enactment, the novel civil RICO remedies rem ained
essentially unused un til the early 1980s.20
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year s ta tu t e  of l im itat ions, see supra  not e 1, m ak ing  th e cr im ina l st at ut e of
limi t a t ions longer, and thus h arder on defendants, than th e civil limitations per iod.
And  th e cr im ina l lim ita tion s  u ses a  “last  pr edi cat e a ct” ru le t o begi n t he  lim ita tion s
period. This w as t he sa me r ule t ha t t he Su prem e Cour t st ru ck down in  Klehr because
it  ext en d e d t he period longer tha n the st atut e intended an d worked an un due
ha rds hip  on civil defendant s. For a discussion of criminal an d civil RICO, see
gener ally G. Rober t Bla key & Br ian  Get tin gs, Racketeer Influ enced and Corrupt
Organ i za t ions (RICO): Basic Concepts—Crim ina l an d C ivi l R em edi es, 53 TEMPLE  L.Q.
1009, 1033-47 (1980) a nd P am ela H . Bucy & St even  T. Mar sha ll, An  Over view  of
RICO , 51 ALA. LAW . 283 (1 990).  For  a com pa ri son  of cri mina l and civil RICO
l imi t a t ions accru al r ules, s ee La nce Br emer  et a l., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organ i za t ions, 34 AM . CRIM . L. RE V. 931 , 95 6-58  (199 7).
21. S ee Wood, supra  not e 17, a t 684  & n.6 (citin g th e tw o decisions ). 
22. S ee Wil li am H. Rehnqu is t , Get  R ICO  Cas es Ou t of M y Cou rtr oom , WALL ST .
J ., May 19 , 1989, a t A14. See also Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Pe rr y, An A nalysis
of the Myth s that B olster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and  the Various Propos als  for
R eform : “Mother o f God—Is  Th is  t he End of RICO?,” 43 VA N D. L. RE V. 851 app. C, tbl.
1 at 1018-19 (1990) (graphi n g t he nu mber  of RICO complain ts filed du rin g a fourt y-
e igh t -mon th pe ri od, a nd  sh owin g t ha t fi lin gs a ver ag ed  80 p er  mo nt h).
23. Ab r a m s, supra  note 19, at  34. “In ea rly 1985, [a] district judge asked
rh etor ically: ‘Would any self-respecting plaintiffs’ lawyer omit a RICO charge these
da ys?’ ” Id. at 52.
24. S ee Blak ey & Get tin gs, supra  not e 20, at 1013-14 (“As finally ena cted, RICO
aut horized the imposition of enhan ced criminal pen a l t ie s  a nd new civil sanctions to
provide new lega l rem edies for a ll types of organized criminal behavior, that is,
enterprise  cri mi na lit y—fr om s im ple  poli ti cal  corr up ti on t o sop hi st ica ted whi te -col la r
crime  sch em es  to t r adi t iona l M afia -t yp e e nde avors.”); Michae l Goldsm ith , Civil RICO
R eform : The Basis for Compromise , 71 MI N N . L. RE V. 827, 828-29, 831 (1987) (“Civil
RICO has en gendered controversy . . . because it has pr incipally been  applied against
w h it e collar ins titu tions ra ther  tha n aga inst t radit ional organized crim e . . . . [bu t ]
Congress pu rp ose ly d ra fte d RI CO t o ad dr es s a  wid e va ri et y of pr oble ms .”).
25. Rehnqu is t , supra  not e 22, a t A14. See also Ab r a m s, supra  note 19, at  53
(“From  the van tage afforded by the mid-1990s, it is evident th at  even civ il RICO’s
1970 congressional opponent s un dere stim at ed th e priva te r emed y’s expa nsive  rea ch.”).
In  fact, only two civil RICO cases  appea red before 1979.2 1
But  in 1988 alone, 1000 complain ts  wer e filed in  fed er a l cou r t .22
The sudd en  i n crea se in pla int iffs’ at torn eys’ use of civil RICO
dur ing the ea r ly a nd m id-1980s led  som e to refer  to t he p eriod
as the “civil RICO explosion.”23 Som e welcom ed  th is  “explos ion ”
and RICO’s in crea sin gly frequ ent  ap plicat ion  again st  “whit e
collar  crim ina ls,”2 4 but  other s believed RICO should be limited
to ap plicat ion aga ins t t ra dit ion a l “mobster” organizations.
Su pr eme  Cour t Ch ief J us tice William  Rehnquist wrote in 1989,
“Vi r tua lly ever yone . .  . agrees  tha t  civi l RICO i s now be ing
us ed in  wa ys that  Congress never intended when it enacted the
s t a tu t e in 19 70.”25 Con se qu en t ly,  the S upr em e Cour t  has
sus ta ined  th e ap plicat ion of RICO “aga ins t  w h ite collar
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26. Goldsmi th , supra  note 24, at 829 (as opposed to “tra ditional organized
cri me ”).
27. Id . (refer rin g to Sed ima , S.P .R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)). In
S ed im a, the Supreme Court h eld that RICO’s “pa t te rn ” elem en t w as  re spon sib le for
i t s “ ‘extr aor dina ry’ uses.” S ed im a, 473 U.S. at 500. In that  opinion the Co u r t  noted
tha t  th e corr ection  of any de fect “mus t lie wit h Con gres s,” i d . at 499,  bu t  implied tha t
“while tw o act s a re  ne cessary [to fo rm  a  pa t ter n ],  they  may n ot  be  su ffi cien t .” Id .  a t
496 n.14. The Cou rt  ma de th e pat ter n elem ent  more  difficult, requ irin g “contin uit y
p lu s re lat ion ship .” Id. (quotin g S. Rep. N o. 91-617, at  158 (1969)). In a  lat er ca se, t he
S u p re m e Court held t hat  the t er m “con du ct” im plie s a  gr ea te r d ea l of pa rt icipa tion
in  the  r acke tee r ing  en te rp r ise  than  pr eviously t hou ght . S ee Reves v. E rn st & Youn g,
507 U.S . 170 , 172  (1993 ); see also H.J . Inc. v. Northwe s t e r n  Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S.
229, 238-39 (1989) (“[T]here is somet hing to a RICO pat tern  beyon d  sim p ly  t he
num ber  of predica te a cts in volved.” (emph asis  in or igina l)). 
28. Blakey & Per ry, supra not e  22,  a t 862; see also Ha cken ber g, supra  note 5,
a t  1421 -22 (su gges tin g th at  som e cou rts  ha ve app lied th e “discovery ru le” to civil
RICO s ta tu te  of  limita t ions becau se i t is  th e m ost  re st ri ctiv e a ppr oach ). For  a
dis cus sion  of th is “discovery rule” and th e courts th at a re applying it, see infra  Pa r t
II.B.2.
29. S ee Un i t ed  S ta t es  Supreme Court Official Transcript  at 44, Klehr  v. A.O.
Smi th  Corp., 117 S. Ct. 1984 (1997) (No. 96-663) (argued April 21, 1997, ava ilable in
1997 WL 205737). Ju stice Kennedy observed:  “It’s  ju s t  s t range t o me th at a  RICO
in ju ry happens, an d then t he RICO pattern  is completed lat er. I  ju s t  fi nd tha t  very
odd . . . . It’s so odd that I’m inclined, if you rea lly believe that , to think  tha t th e 4-
year sta tu te o f l im it a t ions shou ld  be  in ter pr et ed  wi th  sim il a r  od di ty. ”  Id .
30. Id . See also O’Neill , supra note 5, at 172-74 (“Because of the uniqueness and
origina lity of th e pa tt er n con cept , tr ad iti ona l ap pr oach es t o accr ua l can not  a d e qu a t ely
ser ve th e int ere sts  implica ted  in a  priva te civil cau se of action  un der  RICO.”). 
ins tit ut ions,”26 bu t  it  has  “re fra ined from confe r r ing comple t e
leg it im acy [to th i s app lica t ion  of civil RICO].”27 A few
commenta tor s ha ve docum ent ed how th e federa l cour t syst em
has res pon de d t o the “exp los ion ,” or t he perceived abuse of civil
RICO, by consist ent ly “rea d[ing] limit at ions int o the st at ut e’s
pla in la ngu age .”28
Natura lly, those federal courts t ha t  have read l imi ta t ions
in to civil RICO’s plain  langu age ha ve  r es t ricted its u se an d
applica t ion . This  judicia l imp uls e t o restrict civil RICO may
ar ise, in p ar t, fr om a  per cieved st at ut ory confus ion, or  “oddity”
as J us tice Ke nn edy ca lled it  du rin g Klehr or a l a rgumen t s.29
Because civil RI CO com plimen ts t r adit iona l notions  of inju ry
with  its  own “inju ry a nd  pa tt er n” req uir em en t, cour ts  ha ve
become confused  as  to where  these  d iffe ren t  in ju r y
requ i remen t s fit  in to a  civi l RI CO cause  of act ion. Ju st ice
Kennedy a r t i cu la ted  h is  own confus ion  in  Klehr,  “It’s ju st
s t range to me  tha t  a  RICO in ju ry  happen s, an d th en t he RICO
pa tt er n is  complet ed la te r. I  jus t fin d t ha t ver y odd.”30
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31. Agen cy Ho ldi ng  Cor p. v . Ma lle y-Du ff & Ass ocs. , 48 3 U .S.  143 , 15 6 (19 87).
32. Id . at  150. The  Clayt on Act provides  a civil rem edy for an tit r u s t  in j u ries.
S ee 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994). The Cou r t  a d op t ed the Clayton Act limitations period,
in  part , because Congress consciously patter ned civil RICO after t he Clayt on Act. S ee
Malley-Duff, 483 U .S. at 150-51 (compa ring 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) with 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964 (c)); see als o O’Neill, supra note 5, at  186.
33. Malley-Duff, 483  U. S. a t 1 49-5 0 (em ph as is a dd ed ).
34. Id . at  156. See also O’Neill, supra note 5, at  186.
35. Sentelle, supra  note 10, at  157.
36. S ee Hu mes , supra  not e 20, a t 140 0-02; O’Neill, supra  note 5, at  237-38.
37. Kleh r v. A.O. Smith  Corp., 117 S. Ct. 1984, 1998 (1997) (quotin g Klehr  v.
A.O. Sm it h C or p.,  87 F .3d  231 , 23 8 (8t h C ir . 19 96)).
No te a l so  that  e ls ewhere  in  Klehr the Court refers to  t h e E igh th  Circu it ’s  ru le as
the “in ju ry  plus sou rce p lus  pa t t ern” d iscove ry ru l e.  Id . at 19 92. T his  ad dit ion of
“source” to th e ru le formu lat ion crea tes a ddition al issu es. Th is Note discusses these
issues  infra  Pa rt  IV.B.3. See also J ay Ke lly Wrigh t, Statute of L imi tat ions : Duck ing
the Hard Issu es?, RICO L. RE P ., Ju l. 1997, at 14, 14-16.
In  Malley-Duff, t he Cour t  app lie d t he fou r -yea r  Cla yt on  Act
limita t ions period to civil RICO becau se “th e federal policies
tha t  lie  beh in d RICO a nd t he p ract ica lit ies  of RICO lit iga t ion
[made the four -yea r  pe r iod] the m ost  app ropr ia te limit a t ion s
per iod for RICO actions”;3 1  and b eca use  the Cla yt on  Act
“offer[e d] th e closest  an alogy to civil RICO.”32 Bu t  the  Supreme
Court st ressed, even t hen, t ha t RICO was d ifferent  since it was
“designed  to remedy injury cau sed by a pattern  of
ra cket eer ing.”33 RICO’s “p a t tern ” element , the Cour t wr ote,
ma de it  “un iqu e.”34
Oth er  cour t s  have  found  the “pa tt er n” an d “injur y” element s
elusive. One federa l circuit jud ge asked  rhe tor ica l ly , “What is a
‘pa t t ern ’? Th e s hor t  answ er  is  tha t  nobody knows.”35 In
response to RICO ’s u niqu ene ss, eva siven ess, a nd  oddit y, the
circuit  cour ts h ave developed essent ially thr ee conflictin g
accrua l ru les since Malley-Duff: the “injury plus pa tt ern
discover y,” th e “injur y discovery,” an d th e “last  predicat e a ct”
rules. The se r ules  differ from  each  oth er p rim ar ily in  how they
juxtapose the RICO e lem en ts of “pa tt er n” an d “injur y.”36 A brief
summ ary of these rules follows.
B. T he Com pet in g R ulesSA Circu it  Con fl ict
1. The injury plu s pattern discovery rule
 Unde r  th e “injur y plu s pa tt er n d iscovery” ru le, t h e
lim it a t ion s period accrues “ ‘as  soon  as  the plaintiff discovers, or
rea sona bly shou ld have discovered, both t he existen ce and
source of his  in jur y an d t ha t t he  inju ry is  pa rt  of a pa tt er n.’”37
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38. Goldsmith , supra note 24, at  879; see Ha cken ber g, supra  no t e 5 , a t  1424.
Bu t not e, supra  note  13, th e possibilit y in conspir acy cases for a plain tiff to ha ve
suffered a violation of civil RICO before the pa tter n ha s fu lly d eve lope d. T his  Not e
also acknowledges t hat Goldsmith writes his article in support of his compromise
“three-year limita tions  period” proposa l which wou ld accru e at  th e tim e of “the cause
of ac tion  o r  the  la s t  act  caus ing in jur y, which ever  is lat er.” Goldsm ith , supra note 24,
a t  878. Becaus e Goldsm ith ’s pr oposal in cluded  a “last  pre dicat e act ” accrua l ru le, t h e
Klehr decision can  be seen  to ha ve rejected  his p roposa l. See infra Par t II.B.3.
Howeve r , hi s ob se rv at ion  se rv es  to j us ti fy t he  fun da me nt al  cha ra cte ri st ic of a n i n j u ry
and pat ter n dis covery r ule. 
39. P l aintiffs’ Execu tive Com mit tee  Amicus  Brie f at 2 4, Kleh r v. A.O. Smit h
Corp.,  117 S. Ct . 1984 (1997) (No. 96-663). O’Neill a lso n otes t his cr itiqu e in h is
art icle, supra  note 5, at 237, but see h is response infra  text a ccompa nying note 40.
40. O’Neill,  supra  note 5, at  238.
41. S ee Nat ional Association of Secur it ies an d Comm ercial L aw Att orne ys
(NASCAT) Amicus  Brie f at 8 -10, Klehr  v. A.O. Smit h Cor p., 117 S. C t. 1 984 (1997)
(No.  96-663). 
One commentat or  exp la in s t ha t  “[b]ecause  a  pot en t ia l p la in t iff
ha s not been  injured  un der  RICO u nt il the  pa t t e rn  element  has
been satisfied, i t  is  inappropr ia te  to s t a r t  the lim it a t ion s p er iod
before th e pat ter n is fully developed.”38 Pr oponen ts  of this r ule
a rgue th at  it is  th e only r ule  th at  pr eser ves t he  legisla tive
p u r pose. By dela ying st at ut e of limita tion s a ccrua l un til a ll t he
element s of a claim a re p res ent , th e ru le pr eser ves a  poten tia l
pla int iff’s rem edy without  den ying a d efendan t “repose” by
pos tpon ing the  st a tu te  of l imi ta tion s accrua l  beyond  when  the
patt ern element is satisfied.
However , th i s ru le has  its  crit ics. Some a rgu e th at  th is r ule
imposes  a  “[c]umber some [f]act  [f]in ding” bu rde n  on cour t s
because  a cour t m us t d et er min e, often  in p re limin ar y mot ion s,
whet her  and when a  patt ern exists.39 In  res pons e to t his
“cumber some” charge,  one  commenta tor  has  poin ted  ou t  tha t
“[i]f liability is to be imposed on  the  bas is  of defendan t ’s
commission  of a  pa t t ern , i t  i s not  un reasonab le  to r equ i re  t ha t  a
cour t  be able to de fine ju s t  wha t  cons t it u t e s such  a  pa t t ern
and . . . deter mine t he p oi n t at which such a pattern  first
exist s.”40 Oth er cr itics qu est ion wh eth er t he r ule corr ectly
ha ndles  p red ica t e  act s  t ha t  occu r  a ft er a  pat ter n h as been
esta blished and a cause of action has a ccrued.41 In response to
t h i s cr i ti ci sm many cour t s  app ly ing the  rul e hold tha t , i f t he
a ft e r -pa t t ern  inju ry is  an  “ind epen den t in jur y”—one th at  is
pa r t of the  pa t t e rn  b u t  d iscovered a fte r  the pa t t ern  and  a ll
other elem ent s h ave be come cognizable—it  generat es a
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42. Kleh r v. A.O . Sm it h C or p.,  87 F .3d  231 , 23 9 (8t h C ir . 19 96).
43. Id . I n  Klehr, the 8th  Circuit determ ined tha t th e l a t e ac ts  of  mai l and  wire
f r aud th at  th e Klehr s clai m e d c a used “independen t injuries” were not because “they
a re all of the sa me type, flow from th e same sour ce, and  ar e par t of one cognizable
pa t t e rn  of con du ct— [Ha r ve stor e’s ] a ll eg ed  mis rep res en ta t ions reg ardi ng [it s] u n it .” Id .
Thus, “the Kle hr s’ civil RICO cla ims  [were] t ime-ba rr ed.” Id .
44. Refer to the C IV I L RICO  REPORT ’S  ta ble, supra  note  5, for a circuit -by-circuit
break down o f t hose  cour t s t ha t  adop t  t h is  acc rual  ru le . 
45. As opposed t o th e “patt ern .”
46. Ame ri can  Council of Life Insu ra nce  an d H ond a M otor  Com pa ny , In c. Am icu s
Brief at  7 n .5,  Kle hr  v. A.O . Sm it h C or p.,  117  S. C t.  198 4 (19 97) (N o. 96-663) (using
lan gua ge from Sedima , S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985), to suppor t  the
rule).
47. Gr immet t v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 510 (9th  Cir. 19 96), cert . gra nt ed ,  116 S.
C t . 2521 (1996), cert . d ism iss ed a s im prov id ent ly g ran ted , 117 S. Ct . 759 (1997). 
48. Just  w h a t  satisfies the “patter n” element lies beyond the scope of this Note.
S ee generally Sedim a, 473  U.S . at  496 n .14; H .J . In c. v. N or thwest ern  Bell Tel. Co.,
492 U. S. 2 29,  238 -39 (1 989 ).
49. O’Neill,  supra  note 5, at  206.
sepa ra t e cause of a ct ion  wh ich  accrues  im med ia tely  upon
discovery of th at  “sepa ra te” in ju ry .42 I f t he  a ft e r -pa t t ern  in ju ry
is not  “independen t ,” bu t  r at her  pa r t  of “one s in gle , con t in uous
inju ry,” no new action or limitations period accrues.43 I n  tha t
inst an ce, t he action is complete, already actionable, and the
clock  is  runn ing .
2. In ju ry  discover y a nd  in ju ry  ru les
 Cour t s t hat  use t he “injury discovery” ru le44 a rgue tha t
because  “recover able  da mages  . . . flow fr om the com mission  of
the predicate acts” the sta tut e of limitations should begin
runn ing when  th e injury 45 caused by those predicate a ct s i s,  or
shou ld have been, discovered.4 6  Un de r  th is  ru le “[a ] pla in t iff
need  not  d iscover  t ha t  t he inju ry i s pa r t of a  ‘pa t t ern  of
ra cket eer ing’ for th e per iod to begin  to r un .”47 Thu s a RI CO
pla in t iff wh o discover ed  an  in ju ry be fore 1991, b u t  could  not
establish a  pa t t ern  of r acke tee r in g activity un til 1995,48 would
not  be  able  to recover  for  th at  pre-1991 injur y. In such a  case,
the plaintiff may use t he pre-1991 injuries to establish a
pa t t ern , but  ma y not r ecover for th ose inju ries . Tha t p lain t iff
may litera lly have p ar t  of her  cause  of act ion  “bar red  before
[she ] ever h as  th e oppor tu nit y to su e.”49
The crit icism of th is  ru le l ies  in  the p la in  la ngu age of t he
RICO s t a t ute . Cr it i cs  poin t  ou t  the re i s “no indica t ion  tha t
Congress int end ed t o limit r ecoverab le da ma ges . . . in t h is
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50. Id .
51. S ee 18 U.S .C. § 1961(5) (1994). S ee also O’Neill, supra  note 5, at 177 n .26.
52. O’Neill,  supra  note 5, at  206.
53. See infra  P ar t I V.B.2,  for a  mor e com ple te  dis cus sion  of th e in tr icaci es of
th is difference.
54. S ee Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429,  1433  (9th  Cir . 198 4); see also Klehr  v.
A.O. Sm it h C or p.,  117  S. C t.  198 4, 1 994 -95 (1 997 ) (Sca lia , J ., con cur ri ng ).
55. Klehr, 117 S. Ct . at  1994-95 (Scalia , J ., con cur r ing in  pa r t  and  concur r ing
in  the  judgment)  (“Elsewhere in today’s opinion . . .  the Court is quite willing to say
tha t  wh at  is good  for a nt itr us t is  good for RICO . . . . We would thus h ave been
foolish, i n  Malley-Duff,  to speak of ‘adopting’ the Cla yton  Act s ta tu te , an d of
‘pat ter nin g’ the RICO limitat ion period after the  C la yton  Act , i f a l l we  meant  was
us ing the Clayton Act num ber of years.”). Note tha t  J us ti ce Th oma s join ed J us ti ce
Sca l ia ’s concurr ence.
56. S ee supra  text a ccompa nying notes  44-49.
57. S ee supra  text a ccompa nying notes  48-52.
58. Pub.  L. No. 91-452, § 904 (a), 84 St at . 922, 947 (1970 ). S ee O’Neill , su pra
no te 5, at 206, 208-16.
wa y.”50 RICO allows recovery for injuries u p to ten  years  ap a r t ,
provided they a re  pa r t  of t he  same  pa t t e rn of ra cket eer ing. 51
This  ten -year  int ern al lim ita t i on  on  the  sepa ra t ion  of p red ica t e
act s in RICO su ggests t o some t ha t “Congr ess contemp lated
injur ies occur r ing as  much  as  t en  years  apart  and,  wi th tha t  in
m i nd, did n ot  exp licit ly limit  a  pr iva te p la in t iff ’s  r ecovery t o
only the most recent acts.”52
Some cour t s  apply th i s “in ju r y” ru le by using th e time of
“in ju ry” to begin  th e limi t a tions  per iod in st ea d of “inju ry
discover y.” They  sta r t  the  limita t ions  per iod  from the  t ime  the
defendan t  com m itted  a  p red ica t e  act  instead of when  the
p la in t iff discovered, or sh ould h ave  discover ed, h er  inju ry. 53
These cour t s  cla im tha t  they a re  simply app ly ing  the federa l
common law “due  diligen ce” req uir eme nt , which  is also applied
in  Cla yt on  Act  p r ivat e antitr ust actions.54 At least  one Supr eme
Cou r t  ju s t ice  a r gues  th at  th is a nt itr us t r ule is  best  becau se it
na tu ra l ly complet es t he Cla yton Act s ta tu te of limi t at i ons
“adopt ion” tha t  began  in  Malley-Duff.55
But  critics level th e sa me  crit icisms  aga ins t t he  “inju ry” ru le
as aga ins t  the “in ju ry di scover y” ru le: i t  doe s n ot  account  for
the “pa t t ern” e lemen t .56 And  they  argue  tha t  Congress could  not
have int end ed t o creat e an  oner ous “due d iligen ce” burden  on
poten t ia l RICO pla in t iffs. 57 Congress ins tr ucted t ha t RICO be
“libera l ly constr ued.”58 Some quest ion, in light  of th is “libera l
cons t ruct ion” provision, whether Congress would allow the
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59. See O’Neill, supra  no te  5, a t 2 06,  208 -16,  for  a g en er al  dis cus sio n o f th e
issues  raised by these questions.
60. Cf. i d . at 238-39.
61. S ee i d . at 197-208.
62. Keys tone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 198 8) (empha sis
ad de d),  overruled by Kle hr  v. A.O . Sm it h C or p.,  117  S. C t.  198 4 (19 97).
63. Kleh r v. A.O . Sm it h C or p.,  117  S. C t.  198 4, 1 989  (199 7).
s t a tu t e to t oll on  a RICO pla intiff before she h as even
discover ed h er  ra cket eer ing in jur y.59
Defenders  of the “in ju ry d iscover y” an d t he Cla yt on Act
“in ju ry” ru les  poin t  to the r u les ’ ea se  in  app lica t ion  as  t heir
redeeming value. 60 The cause of action still  requires a pat t ern ,
bu t a  new s ta tut e of limita tions will run  for ea ch injury. The
cour t s t ha t  apply these  ru le s do not  need  to resolve complex
pa t t ern  issu es  ju st  to app ly t he s t a tu te of limit a t ion s.  Bot h
ru les pr ovide “sepa ra te a ccrua l” p r ov isions for a fter-pat ter n
injuries. In  doing so, t hey treat a fter-patt ern injuries no
differen tly  than  those  t h a t occur red before  a  pa t t e rn  was
established. Each  in jury is only recovera ble for four year s after
it is eith er committ ed or discovered. 61
3. Last predicate act rule
 The “last  predicat e act” rule begin s lik e t he  “inju r y p lus
pa t t e r n discover y” ru le,  bu t  then  cont in ues . Th e limit a t ion s
per iod, accordin g to th is r ule, a ccrues  at  th e tim e
t h e p l a in t i f f knew o r  sh ou ld  have  kn ow n  t h a t t h e el em en ts  of
t h e  c iv i l RICO cause  o f  ac t ion  ex i s t ed  un less, as  a p ar t of  t h e
s am e pat ter n of  racke teer ing a ct ivi ty ,  ther e  is  fur t her  injur y to
t h e pla in tiff or  fur th er  pr ed ica te  a cts  occu r, i n  wh ich  ca s e  t h e
a ccr u a l pe riod  sha l l  run  f rom the  t im e  when  the  p l a in t i ff  knew
or  sh ould  h a ve k n own  of th e la st  in ju ry  or t h e la st  pr ed ica te
a ct  w h ich  is  par t  of  the sa me  pat ter n of  racke teer ing a ct ivi ty .62
Und er  th is r ule, if one p red icat e act  was  commit ted  with in  t he
four  years preceding the suit,  the plaintiffs m ay r ecove r  “not
just for  any added ha rm caused  them by tha t  la t e -commi t ted
act , but  for a ll the h ar m cau sed . . . by all the acts  th at  ma ke up
th e t ota l ‘pa tt er n.’”63
Like th e court s t ha t a pply t he “inju r y” and  “in ju ry
discover y” rules, the courts applying the “last p r edica te a ct”
ru le in civil RICO cases do not need  to deter mine wh en a
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64. U.S. Supreme Court  Official Transcript a t 15, Kleh r v. A.O. Sm ith  Corp.,
117 S. C t.  198 4 (19 97) (N o. 96 -663 ).
65. S ee supra  text  accompa nyin g notes  50-52 (argu ing t her e is “no indicatio n
tha t  Con gr es s in te nd ed  to l im it  re cove ra ble  da ma ges  . . . i n t hi s w ay ”).
66. S ee K lehr, 117 S. Ct . at  1989. See also infra text a ccompa nying notes  105-
11.
67. S ee K lehr, 117 S. Ct. at 1990.
68. Id . at 1989.
69. Id . (qu oti ng  Wils on  v. G ar cia , 47 1 U .S.  261 , 27 1 (19 85)) . This  No te
recognizes, along with th e C ou r t  i n  Kleh r, th at  “RICO’s cr im ina l st at ut e of lim ita tion s
runs f rom the l a st , i.e. , th e mos t r ecent , pre dica te  act . Bu t t he re  ar e s ign ifica nt
differences  betwe en civil a n d criminal RICO actions, and th is Court has held th at
c r imina l RICO does not provide an apt  an alogy.” Id . at 1 990 (citing Agency H olding
Corp. v. M al ley -Du ff & Ass ocs. , 48 3 U .S.  143 , 15 5-56  (198 7)).
70. Pr ofess or  G. Robert Blak ey was Chief Counsel of the Sen ate Su bcommit tee
on  Cr imina l Laws and  P rocedures in  1969-70  wh en  th e Or ga ni zed  Cr im e Con tr ol Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), was drafted  an d en act ed.  Th is Act
included RICO. But see Blak ey & Ces sar , supra  n o te 14, at 851 n.* (“[T]he worst
pe r son  t o  co n st r ue [a st at ut e] is th e per son wh o [was] re spon sible for it s dr aftin g. He
is very m uch d isposed t o confuse wh at  he in ten ded t o do with th e effe ct  of th e
lan gua ge which in fact has been em ployed.” (quoting Hilder v.  Dexter [1902] App.
Cas. 474 , 47 7 (H al sb ur y, L or d, L .C. ))).
71. S ee Nat ional Association of Secur it ies an d Comm ercial L aw Att orne ys
(NASCAT) Amicus Brief at 14-21, Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 117 S. Ct. 1984 (1997)
(No.  96-6 63).
pa t t ern  first develops before t hey can r ule on whet her  it s
s t a tu t e of lim it a t ion s  h as  run  or  not .  Bu t  the  concern  wi th  the
“last  pred ica t e a ct ” ru le i s t ha t  it  may a llow  the s t a tu te t o “ru n
forever .”64 Where th e “injur y discovery” an d “injur y” ru les were
unfa i r to pot e n t ia l plain tiffs by thr eat enin g to limit a  RICO
pla int iff’s des er ved r ecover y ,6 5 th e “last p red icat e act ” ru le
imposes an  inequ ita ble ha rd sh ip on defendan ts, depr iving them
of th e “repose” that  sta tu tes of limitat ions genera lly provide,
even to wrongdoers.66
The Supreme Cour t  rejected  th e “last p red icat e act ” ru le in
Klehr.67 The Cour t ’s concern wa s th at  th e ru le allowed “a ser ies
of pr ed ica te a ct s .  . . [t o] con t inu e ind efinit ely” thu s
“length en [ing] th e lim ita tion s pe riod d ra ma tica lly.”68 Th e  r ule
would  pe rmit  “pla in t iffs  who know of the defendan t ’s  pa t t ern  of
act ivity simply to wait , ‘sleepin g on their rights,’ .  . .  as the
pa t t ern  continues an d treble damages accumu late, perhaps
brin ging su it  only long a fter  th e ‘me mor ies of wit ne sse s h ave
fade d or e viden ce is lost .’”69
Robert  Blak ey,70 however , in a  Klehr am icus brief, defended
the “last  predicat e act ” ru le.71 He a rgu ed t ha t t he d ist inct ion
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72. S ee id . at 8-9.
73. Id . at 12.
74. Id . at 14.
75. S ee Kleh r v. A.O. Sm ith  Corp., 11 7 S. Ct . 1984, 1988 (1997). The Cour t calls
r e sponden t s A.O. Smith  Corp. a nd A.O. Sm ith  H a r ves tor e P rod uct s, I nc.,  Ha rv est ore
collectively. See id .
76. The res ponden t, A.O. Smit h Corp . (whom t he Cou rt  simp ly calls
“Harvestore”) made t hese alleged misr epre sen ta tions  th rough  a su bsidiar y, A.O. Smith
Harves tore Pr oduct s, In c., and  its a ut hor ized dea ler, M VBA Har vest ore Sys tem s. S ee
Klehr v A.O. Smith  Corp., 87 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996). Was there  a RICO
enterprise  problem with th is case? The Court does not give enou g h  fac ts  t o de t ermine
h o w p la i n t iffs portr ayed t he en ter prise  in t heir  action  an d an y discuss ion of this is su e
lies beyond the scope of this ar ticle.
between  the  “in jur y  plu s p a t t er n d iscover y” an d “inju ry
discover y” ru les becomes  muddied because ea ch of th ose rules
req uir es a n a ddit iona l “sepa ra te a ccrua l” pr ovision to dea l with
after -patt ern  injuries.72 According t o Bla key,  anyt im e t he cou r t
needs to apply a  “sepa ra t e accrua l” ru le  for  addi t iona l a ft e r -
pa t t ern  injuries it  mean s th a t  a  “mer itor ious  pl a in t iff’s RICO
claim s ar e un jus tifia bly tim e-bar re d.”73 The “last  p red ica t e  act ”
ru le, he writes, is the only possib le rule that conserves a
complet e civi l RI CO cla im  for  the RICO pla int i ff t ha t  su ffe r s
“multiple in ju r ies  a r is in g fr om mult ip le p red ica te a ct s
ext en din g over a  per iod of time .”74
Even  though  the  Supreme  Cour t  r e ject ed the  “l a st  p red ica t e
act ” ru le in  Klehr, Blak ey’s defen se of th e ru le ra i ses  i ssues  tha t
the Cou r t  wil l even tua lly  need t o res olve . F or  in st ance, h ow
should th e RICO s ta tu te of limit at ions  t r ea t  complex pa t t erns
an d th e injuries  tha t  occur  a ft e r  the pa t t ern  e lement  i s in it i a lly
satisfied? Sh ould  the s t a tu te of lim it a t ion s l im it  a  pla in t iff ’s
recovery in ways t he st at ut e does not? This Note will r e tu rn to
these issu es a nd  to fur th er a na lysis of all t h r ee of th e a bove
accrua l rules in Part  IV, but first  it  pr ovid es  a  br ief s ummary of
the  Cour t ’s  holding in  Klehr.
III. KL E H R  V. A.O. S M I T H 
A.  Facts
Mar vin and Mar y Klehr filed suit against a Ha rvestore silo
ma nu factur er  and  dea le r  a lmost  20 yea rs  aft er  th ey bough t
their  si lo from the  dea le r .75 The  Kleh rs , who wer e da iry
fa r m e r s,  a l l eg e d  t h a t ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  H a r v e s t o r e ’s
representat ions,76 th eir s ilo “d id  not  keep  oxygen  away from the
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77. Klehr, 117 S. Ct. at 1988.
78. Id . at  199 2. T he  im por ta nce  of deter minin g the sour ce of the in jury will be
discussed infra  Par t IV.B.3.





Id . a t  1988.  Harves tore installed an  unloading device that chopped up t he feed
inst an tly  as  it e me rg ed fr om t he  silo t o  h id e  t h e mold. See id.  And thr ough dealer
advertisements, Ha rv est ore  “tr ied  to convince farmer s that war m, brown, molasses-
sme ll ing feed  wa s not  fe rmen ted  feed , b u t  good  feed .” Id .
80. Id .
81. S ee id .
82. The Kleh r s  fi led  their  act ion  August  27, 1993. Th us, t he a ccrua l dat e would
need  to fall wit hin  four yea rs b efore t ha t da te, i.e ., afte r Augu st 2 5, 1989. See id .
83. S ee id .
84. Id . at 1993.
85. Id . at 1988.
feed, th e feed becam e moldy and ferm ent ed, th e cows at e th e
bad feed [making them  sick], and  milk p roduct ion  and  profi t s
went  down .”77 The  Cour t n oted  th at  th is in ab ility to lim it  the
amount  of oxyge n  tha t  could  get  to the feed was “th e source of
the [Klehr s’] injur y.”78 The  Kleh rs  alle ged  t ha t  Harves tore  had
a t tempt ed to cover  up i t s fr aud—H arves tore con cea led : (1) t he
fact  tha t  oxyge n  got  in to the feed  and s poi led  a  la rge p ar t  of it ,
and  (2 ) the  fact  tha t  the
feed was  spoiled a t a ll.79 The Klehrs a rgued tha t H ar vestore’s
act ion s amounted to several acts of mail and wire frau d,
“thereby violating RICO and causing them injury.”80
Accordin g to the Klehrs , their  injury began  when  th ey
bough t  th e silo in 197 4, an d becau se H ar vest ore cont inu ed to
cover up its fraud , con t inued  th rough  the years  a ft e r  the
pur chase. 81 To make the ir  act ion  t ime ly  under  t he four -year
limitat ions period the  Klehrs  needed  to show ei ther  (1 ) tha t  the
limi ta t ions period accrued a fter August  25, 1989,82 or  (2) t ha t
som e s pe cia l lega l doct r in e t olled t he r unnin g of lim it a t ion s. 83
The Cour t  d isposed of the “tolling d octrin e” possibility qu ite
eas ily. It  he ld  tha t  “‘fr audu len t  concea lmen t ’ i n t he  con text  of
civil RICO embodies a  ‘d u e diligen ce’ re qu ire me nt .”84 Alth ough
the Kleh rs  claime d t hey on ly became “sufficiently suspicious” to
inve st igat e Ha rves tor e’s cla ims a bout t he silo after 1991, 85 t he
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86. Id . at 1992.
87. Id . at 1993.
88. S ee id . at 1988 (“We granted cer tiorar i in this cas e to consider th e Kle h r s’
claim  in light  of a split of au th ority a mong t he Cou rt s of Appeals.”). As noted supra
no te 76, the Court does not addres s or  re vie w t he  su fficie ncy  of th e e lem en ts  of a
RICO act ion: i.e., con du ct, en ter pr ise, p at ter n, r ack ete eri ng a ctivit y, or in jur y. S ee
supra  Pa rt  II.A.
89. Klehr, 117 S. Ct. at 1989.
90. 863 F .2d 1125 (3d Cir . 1988), overruled by Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 117
S. Ct  1984  (1997 ); see also supra text a ccompa nying notes  62-69.
91. Klehr , 117 S. Ct . at 1 986. Tha t is, t he Cou rt  ass um ed th at  th e Klehr s could
show an  inj ur y or a ct w hich  wa s pa rt  of Ha rv est ore ’s  p a tte rn  of  racke teer ing tha t
occurr ed betw een  Augus t 198 9 an d Augu st 1 993. 
92. The Thir d Cir cuit is  th e only cour t a pplyin g th is ru le. S ee CI V I L RICO
REPORT ’S  ta ble, supra  no te 5 . The  Cour t  a lso assumes tha t  the difference between t he
Th ird an d oth er circu its “ha s not hin g to do with  th e plain tiff ’s stat e of min d or
kn owledge.” Klehr, 117 S. Ct. at 1989.
Eigh th  C ircu i t and  the d is t r ict  cou r t  both  found  tha t  “the
Klehrs  sh ould  rea son ably  have d iscover ed  the s ilo’s fla ws  before
1989 (and  tha t  a  reasonab le  fact finder  cou ld not  conclu de  to the
con t r a ry),”86 an d wer e th us  not  du ly diligent  in dis covering
th eir  injury a nd it s source. The Supreme  Cour t  r e fused  to
review th is finding of th e lowe r  cour t s . As  a  r esu lt ,  t he  Cour t
held  tha t  t he Kleh r s cou ld not  r e sor t  to a  tolling d octrin e
because  “a  p la in t iff who i s not  r e a son ably  di ligen t  may n ot
a s ser t  ‘fr audu len t  concea lmen t .’”87 The r e st  of t he  Cour t ’s
discu ssion  in Klehr focuse s on ly on  wh et her  the low er  cour t
should h ave ap plied a different  accrua l  ru le th an  it did in order
to m ak e t he  Kleh rs ’ RICO a ction t ime ly.88
B. The Accrual  Ru le a t  Is sue in  Klehr —T he Suprem e Court’s
Reason ing
 The Su pr em e Cour t a ckn owledged th at  th e “last  p red ica t e
act” ru le was  “the  on ly accrua l ru le [among th e compet ing ru les
in  th e circuit cour ts] th at  can h elp th e Kleh rs .”89 The Cour t
ass um ed in  it s  r eason ing tha t  the app lica ble  “las t  pr ed ica te a ct”
ru le was  th e ru le st at ed a bove by th e Th ird  Circu it in  Keystone
Insurance Co. v . H ough ton ,90 an d t ha t t he K lehr s could “show a t
lea st  one s uch  lat e-commit te d a ct.”91
However , t he S up rem e Cour t u ltim at ely reject ed t he T hir d
Cir cu it ’s “last  predicat e act” rule.92 In  ora l  a rguments one
just ice expressed  wha t seem ed to reflect the Cour t’s gener a l
concern , “[I]s i t  your view, then, the sta tut e would run
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93. U.S. Supreme Court  Official Transcript at  15, Klehr  v. A.O. Smit h Cor p.,
117 S. Ct. 1 984 (1997) (No. 96-663). 
94. The Klehrs’ claim involved fraud, the type tha t Chief Justice Rehnquist
r eferred to  when  he  poin ted ou t  tha t  “c iv il  RICO i s  now being used  in  ways tha t
Congress never inten ded.” Reh nqu ist, supra  note 22, at A14. Rehnquist continued,
“Wheth er  it is a good idea to have a civil counter part for wire  f raud  and  mai l f raud
is at  lea st  open  to q ue st ion,  it s eem s t o me , quite apa rt from th e question whet her
tr eble da mage s shou ld  be  awa rde d [ for  thos e o ffe nses ].” Id . 
95. Klehr, 117  S. C t.  at  198 9 (“[The Third C ircuit ’s ru le] the reby conflicts wit h
a  ba sic ob jective—r ep ose —th at  un de rl ies  lim it at ion s p er iods .”). F or  a d iscu ss ion  of th e
policy under lying the principle of “repose,” see infra  text accompanying notes 105-11.
96. Kleh r v. A.O. Smit h Corp ., 117 S. Ct. a t 1988 (qu oting Kleh r v. A.O. Smit h
Corp.,  87 F .3d  231 , 23 8 (8t h C ir . 19 96)).
97. Id .
98. S ee id . a t 1 992  (poin ti ng  out  th at  to r evie w t he  Ei gh th  Cir cui t’s a pp lica t ion
would  require the Court to “examin[e] an evidentiary record of several thousand
pages to d et er mi ne  th e va lidi ty  of th e in dep en den t con clu sion  of ea ch o f th e t wo lower
cou rt s”). 
99. Id . at 1991.
forever  . . . ? I m ea n , you  say t he las t a ct. Well, all right , ther e’s
a n  act . . . . [N ]ow d o I go b ack for  1,0 00  yea rs?”93 Given th e
Supreme Cour t ’s  gener al a tt itu de towa rd t he civil RICO
“explosion,” an d t he  facts  of the  case , it is  pr obably s a fe  t o say
tha t  th e Court  did not feel overly sympat hetic to the Klehrs’
cause of act ion .94 But  even in  a ca se wit h a  mor e sym pa th etic
pla int iff, th e Cour t p roba bly would  not h ave decided differen tly
because  it r ecognized t he im por tance of a  st a tu te of limit a t ion s
in p rovidin g for a d efend an t’s “re pose.”95
Accordin g to t he “inju ry plus  pat ter n discovery” ru le tha t
was applied by the Eighth Circuit,  the Klehrs’ civi l RI CO act ion
should ha ve accrued “‘as s oon as [t hey] d iscover [ed ], or
rea sona bly shou ld ha ve discovered, both t he existen ce and
source of [t he ir ] i nju ry and  tha t  t he  in ju ry [was] pa r t  of a
pa tt er n.’”96 The Eigh th  Circuit found t ha t t he Klehr s suffered
in ju ry “somet ime in  th e 1970s ” an d “should  ha ve discovered”
the pa t t ern  “well before Au gus t 1 989.”97 There fore , under  the
“in ju r y and patt ern discovery” rule, dismissal of the Klehrs’
lawsu it was  clearly proper.
Alth ough  the  Supreme  Cour t  ru l ed t ha t t he E ight h Cir cuit
was cor rect  not  t o have  app li ed  the “l a st  p red ica t e  a ct ” r u l e, it
refused  to r eview the E ighth  C ircu it’s  app lica t ion of it s “inju ry
plus  pat ter n discovery” ru le. The Court d id not end orse an y of
the ru les described above,98 and w ould  not  se t t le t h is  “conflict []
among the Circuits”99 becau se “[t]he lega l ques tion s in volved
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100. Id . at 1992.
101. Id .
102. S ee Agen cy H oldi ng  Cor p. v.  Ma lley -Du ff & Ass ocs. , 483 U.S. 143, 156
(198 7).
103. Id . at 152.
104. S ee id . a t 1 53 (“ The federal policies at sta ke and the pr act ical iti es of
lit iga tion  str ongly suggest th at t he limita tions per iod of the Cl a y t on Act is a
significan tly  mor e ap propr iat e st at ut e of limita tion s . . . .”). But see O’Neill, supra
no te 5, a t 2 15 &  n. 267  (“[A]nt it ru st  la ws  ar e, i n e ss en ce, p re se rv at ive .”).
105. S ee Malley-Duff, 483  U.S . at  156; s ee also supra note 3.
may be su bt le a nd  difficult.”100 The Cour t  ind ica t ed tha t  it
would  “wa i t  for  a  ca se tha t  cl ea r ly  pre sen t s t hese , or  r e la t ed
issues  . . . before [it  would ] at te mp t t o res olve th em .”101 The
ne xt  Part  of this Note analyzes some of these “subtle a nd
difficult” legal qu est ions t ha t t he Cou rt  will nee d t o add res s in
an y futur e an alysis of th is issue.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. S ta tu tes  of L im it at ion s: Firs t Princip les
 Be fore get t in g in to the s ubt le l ega l qu es t ion s surrounding
civil RICO st a tu te of limit a t ion s a ccrual, h owever , t h is  Not e
will p rov ide an  in t roductory  ana l ysis of th e genera l principles
under lying s t a tu t es  of l imi t at ions: r ecovery a nd  re pose. I n
Malley-Duff, th e Supr eme Cour t a dopted RICO’s four -year
s t a tu t e of lim it a t ion s fr om the m ost  closely  ana logou s federa l
sta tu te,  t he  Clayton  Act .102 The  Cour t s pecifically noted  the
“p r ivat e tr eble-dam ages” rem edy the t wo s t a tut es sha re. 103 In
Malley-Duff, th e Cour t  sough t  t o p reserve RICO’s  s t atu tory
remedy by ap plyin g th e  sa m e limita tions per iod tha t pr eserved
the Clayt on Act r em edy. 104 As  a  matt e r  of s t a tu te of l imi ta t ions
prin ciple, the  Cour t  r ecogn ized t ha t  a  st a tu te’s lim it a t ion s
per iod sh ould p re ser ve th e st at ut ory r em edy: r ecovery.
Bu t , recove ry is  not  the on ly pr inciple at pla y here. Th e
Malley-Duff Cour t  r e jected the suggest ion  tha t  RICO be l eft
without a limitations period.105 The Court  observed:
A fede ra l  cause  o f ac t ion  “b rough t  a t  an y  d i s t ance  o f t ime”
w ou ld  be  “u t t e r ly  re pu gn an t t o th e ge n iu s of ou r la ws .” . . .
J u s t  de te rm in at ion s of fa ct ca n n ot b e m ad e w h en , beca u se  of
t h e pas sage  of tim e, t h e m em orie s of w itn es se s h av e fa de d or
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106. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. a t 156 (qu oting Wils on v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271
(1984) (cit at ion s om it te d)).
107. S ee O’Neill, supra  note 5, at 190-91 (describing four m ajor concerns
“influencing  th e d et er mi na ti on  of th e s ta tu te  of lim it at ion s”).
108. S ee Kle hr  v. A.O . Sm it h C or p.,  117  S. C t.  198 4, 1 989 -90 (1 997 ).
109. Id . at 1989.
110. Id . at 1990.
111. Id . at 1989.
112. S ee Wrigh t, supra  not e 37 , at  16; cf. K leh r, 117 S. Ct. at 1987.
113. S ee Wrigh t, supra  no te 37 , a t  16  (“Perhaps  given  the  hard qu estion s, it is
un ders ta nda ble tha t  the Sup rem e Cour t’s decision in Klehr i s s imp ly  a  holding
act ion .”).
evi de n ce  is  lost. I n com pellin g c ir cum s tan ces , even  wrongdoer s
a re  en t i t l ed  to  a s sum e  tha t  t h e i r  s in s  ma y  be  fo rgo t t en .106
The Malley-Duff Cour t  t hus  recognized anothe r  st a tu t e  of
lim it a t ion s principle: repose for  the defendan t .107 The concept  of
repose acknowledges th at  our lega l  syst em  use s l im it a t ion
periods to compensa te for  t h e poten tia l da nger  of a sta le claim
and to allow alleged wrongdoers th e opportun ity to “get on  with
life.”
In  short , a st at ut e of limit a tions sh ould: (1) preserve a
pla int iff’s legisla tive  recovery while (2) providing the defendant
with p rocedura l repose. These seem  to be stat ute of limitat ions’
“firs t p rin ciples.”
It  wa s  pr ecisely becau se t he T hir d Cir cuit  ru le (“las t
p red ica t e act”),  a t  is sue in  Klehr, violated  t h i s second p rin ciple
tha t  the  Cour t  s t ruck it down .108 The “last  predicat e act” rule,
t h e Court  wrote , “lengthens  t h e limit at ions p eriod
dramat ica l ly .”109 Con gr es s cou ld  not  have in ten de d t o a llow
RICO plaint iffs to “sleep[] on th eir right s” indefinitely, but
inten ded to “en cour age p oten tia l pr ivat e pla int iffs to diligent ly
investigate” their RICO injuries.110 The “last  pr edicat e act ” ru le
violated  th e re pose pr inciple by “creat [ing] a lim it a t ion s p er iod
th at  [was ] longer  th an  Congr ess  could h ave  conte mp lat ed.”111
B. Lin geri ng Qu est ion s
 So wh en  sh ould  the RICO li mit a t ion s period accrue? The
Supreme Cou r t  doe s n ot  often  conside r  accrua l a sp ect s of
s t a tu t e of limitat ions law,112 and it s  “a t t empt” in  Klehr d id  not
r esolve t he pend ing circuit conflict. Bu t Klehr does  p rov ide an
int ere st ing discussion of wha t t he Court  did not r esolve.113 For
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114. U.S. Suprem e Court Official Transcript  at 7, Klehr  v. A.O. Smith  Corp., 117
S. Ct . 19 84 (1 997 ) (No.  96-6 63).
115. O’Neil l, supra  note 5, at 191-92. O’Neill uses Developments in the
L aw—S tatutes o f L imi tat ions, 63 HARV. L. RE V. 1177, 1200 (1950), to sup p or t  t h is
axi om in his ar ticle.
116. In  1995, Con gres s am end ed 18 U .S.C. § 1964(c), to cre a t e  a  s ecu r it i es  fr aud
excep tion  to civil RICO act ions. “[N]o pers on ma y rely u pon a ny condu ct th at  would
ha ve been actionable as fr a u d  in  t h e pur chas e or sa le of securit ies to es ta blish [civil
RICO pre dicat e act s].” 18 U.S.C.A. § 19 64(c) (W es t S up p. 1 998 ). A pl ai nt iff h as  no
cause of action , though sh e may ha ve injuries, unt il the defendant  has been
crimin ally con v ic t ed of securit ies fra ud. If t he de fenda nt  ha s been  crimin ally
convicted, th e cla im  accr ue s a nd  “th e st at ut e of lim ita tion s sh all  st ar t t o ru n on  t he
da te on  wh ich  the c on vi ct ion  be com es  fina l. ” Id . The plaintiff has no action before th e
convi ction  and t he sta tut e does not postpone limitations period accrual past  tha t time.
S ee Pr ivat e Secu rit ies Lit igat ion Reform  Act of 1995, P. L. 104-67,  1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(109 Sta t. 737 ) 679, 698. 
117. S ee Kleh r,  117 S. Ct. at 1992. The Court h ad the opportunity to address the
accrua l per iod d ur in g t he  199 8 t er m b ut  den ied  cert ior ar i. S ee Blakey & Gettings,
supra  n ote  20, a t 1 047 (i nd icat ing  th at  th e st at ut e of lim ita tion s is su e is  “one of t he
most impor ta nt  an d as ye t u nse tt led issu es in p riva te civil actio ns”); Mueller, supra
no te 7, at 10 (recommen ding at  the t ime th at t he Su prem e Cou r t  g r a n t  cer t i ora r i  t o
Det ri ck v. Pa na lpina , Inc., 108  F.3d  529 (4th  Cir. 19 97), cert . d eni ed  65  U.S.L.W. 3783
(U.S. Ma y 16 , 19 97) (N o. 96 -182 0)).
examp le, one J ust ice comme nt ed d ur ing Klehr or a l a rgumen t s,
“I don’t see wh y the s t a t u te wouldn’t  begin  to run  once you  can
say all the elements of th e RICO ca us e of action a re in
existence.”114 Other comment ators have noted, along the sam e
lines, t ha t  “[a ]s  a  genera l  m a tte r , the  st a tu te  of l imi ta t ions
begins  to run  when  the  pla in t iff ’s  cause of act ion  has
accru ed.”115 Congr ess ’ only a t t emp t t o addr ess civil RICO
lim it a t ion s se em s t o su st a in  tha t  in clin a t ion .116 These
obs er va t ion s do “beg  the qu es t ion ,” bu t  they p rovide a  use ful
poin t of referen ce. The  RICO lim it a t ion s p er iod  sh ould  accrue
when  th e RICO cause of act ion  accrues,  not  before , not  a ft e r .
Tha t bei n g t h e  case, wh en t he S up rem e Cour t cons ider s civil
RICO limit at ions p eriod a ccrua l aga in 117 i t  will need to addr e ss
the following iss ues : (1) whe th er t he lim iat ions p eriod s hou ld
run  from  in jur y a lone  or fr om in jur y  a nd pat ter n; (2) whet her
the limit at ions p eriod s hou ld be a  discovery (pla int iff ’s
kn owledge) ru le or inju ry (defen da nt ’s comm ission ) ru le; (3) if it
is a d iscovery r ule, wh et her  it  sh ould  run  from discover y of
in ju ry, discover y of t he in ju ry a nd s ource of injur y, or discovery
of the ca use  of act ion ; and (4 ) give n  tha t  the Cour t  st ruck down
the “last p redicate a ct” ru le, how a n  appr opria te r ule s hou ld
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118. This  Note  def ines  “a ft e r -pa t t e rn  injur ies” as those injuries discovered after
the pattern  has initially developed. For a discussion of initial pattern requirem ents,
see gener ally Sedim a, S.P.R .L. v. Im rex Co., 473 U.S . 479, 496 n.14 (1985), and H .J .
Inc. v. N orth wes tern  Bell  Tel . Co. , 49 2 U .S.  229 , 23 8-39  (198 8).
119. Klehr, 117 S. Ct. at 1992.
120. This  reformulat ion resembles th e deductive logic doctrine of equivalency: (1)
if A, then B; (2) if C, then D; (3) B=C; (4) ther efore, if A, then D.
121. Klehr, 117 S. Ct . at  1990. See also supra text a ccompa nying notes  33-34.
122. Dur ing Kleh r  o r a l a rgumen t s , one member  o f t he  Cour t  no ted  the
metaph ys ica l na tu re  of th is d ist inct ion a sk ing , “[C]an  [th er e] be  a R ICO  inj ur y befor e
ther e’s a RICO in existence[?]” U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript a t  6, Klehr  v.
A.O. Sm it h C or p.,  117  S. C t.  198 4 (19 97) (N o. 96-663). But see supra  note 13
(di scuss ing an  exce pt ion  to t hi s r ul e in  RI CO co ns pir acy  cas es ).
123. S ee O’Neill, supra  no t e 5 , a t  238  (“I f l iab il it y is to be im posed on t he ba sis
of defe nd an t’s comm iss ion of a  pa tt er n, i t is  not  u n reasonab le  to r equ ir e  t ha t  a
cour t  . . . define just what  constitut es such a patt ern an d . . . deter mine the  poin t
a t  which  such  a pa tt ern  first  exist s.”). But see supra  note 13 and accompanyin g text
( admit t i ng th at  th e r ule  pr opose d in  th is N ote  ma y n eed  to prov ide  an  excep tion  for
RICO conspira cy cases beca use  in t hose in sta nces it  is conceivable  for a  p la in t if f t o
ha ve suffer ed in jur y before a  pat ter n of ra cket eer ing h as b een  est ablis hed ). 
124. In  fact, civil RICO was  design ed to pr ovide a r emed y for a  pla int iff wh o ha s
t r ea t the  a ft e r -pat ter n injur ies118 of a  RICO cause  of act ion .
This  Not e will u se or igin a l  ana lysi s and  some  of t he  Cour t ’s
ana lysi s from Klehr to answer these questions.
1. Injury or pattern accrual?
 The Klehr Cou r t  noted  tha t  the  “major  d iffe rence  among  the
Circuits”119 is over whether the RICO limitat ions per i od sh ould
accrue for each  inju ry in dividu ally or upon t he development  of a
pa t t ern  of ra cke teer in g. H owever , given  the im pl ica t ion s of t he
Cou r t ’s comment s above—tha t  t he RICO s t a tu t e of l imi t at ions
should accrue  a t  the sa me t ime t he RICO ca use  of act ion
accrues, not  before, n ot  a ft er —the ques t ion  becomes: Does a
RICO cau se of  act ion  accrue for e a ch  i n ju ry  or  for  a  pa t t ern  of
ra cket eer ing?120 With  th i s question in mind, th e initia l sketches
of a solut ion to this m ajor circuit conflict begin t o appear .
The Cour t exp lain ed in  Klehr t ha t  “civil RI CO requir es  not
just a s ingle  act, but  ra th er  a ‘pa tt er n’ of acts.”121 Though  it  may
be a m et ap hys ical, difficult , an d  cu m bersom e d et er min a t ion ,122
it  wou ld  be  in app ropr ia te for  a  cour t  to sta rt  th e sta tu te of
limi ta t ions runnin g on  a  RICO pla in t iff be fore  sh e h as s uffered
in ju ry by a p at te rn  of rack et eer ing. 123 Th is  does  not  mean  tha t
the in ju r ies  res u lt in g fr om in divid ua l pred ica te a ct s a re
irr eleva nt ,124 bu t  Con gr es s e st abli sh ed  a  rem ed y for  i n ju r ies
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been “in ju red  . .  . by r eason  o f a  v io la t ion  o f [RICO’s s u b st a n t ive provisions].” 18
U.S.C. § 1964 (c) (1994); s ee a lso supra  not es 1 1-15 a nd  accom pa ny ing  te xt for  a
dis cus sion  of these  subs ta nt ive provisions. These individual pr edicate acts ar e an
in tegra l pa rt  of th e st at ut ory  cau se of a ction .
125. Requ i r ing the courts  to make t his cumber some me taphys ica l pa t t ern
det er mi na tion  may ha ve ot h e r  be n efits. It may prompt  Congress or the Su preme
Cou rt  to develop a more clear a nd  judicious definition of “pattern.” The curren t
pa t t e rn  requiremen ts are discussed supra  notes 27, 48.
126. S ee d iscuss ion  supra  notes 27, 48.
127. Kleh r v. A.O. Smith  Corp., 117 S. Ct. at 1990.
128. This  Note assumes tha t the civil RICO statut e of limitations does n o t  accru e
u n til  the pat tern elemen t has been sa tisfied, i.e., it will not accrue before a patte r n
of ra cket eer ing firs t de velops. S ee exp lan at ion  supra  Par t IV.B.1. 
129. Mr . Wrigh t  is  a  part n e r  a t  Arno ld  & Por t e r  and i s a  member  o f t he
Advis ory  Board of the RICO  LAW RE P O R TE R . S ee Wrigh t, supra  note 37, at  14-16.
130. S ee id .
131. Id . at 14.
caused by a pattern of predicate acts, and th e existence of a
RICO claim depen ds up on th e existence of tha t  pa t t ern .125
Given th i s,  it  i s not  unreasona ble to r equ i re  a  cour t  t o
dete rmine when  tha t  p a ttern first exists.126 Thus,  the
appropr ia t e limitat ions per iod  shou ld accrue  when  thi s pa t t ern
first develops.
2. Discovery or injury?
 The Klehr Cour t  noted tha t “ther e is some deba te  as t o
whet her  the r unnin g of t he limit a t ion s p er iod  de pe nds  on t he
pla int iff’s awa ren es s of ce r t a in  ele men ts of t he ca use of
act ion.”127 The Court  ask ed, in other  words: Should we st ar t  the
lim it a t ion s per iod  from when  the  de fenda n t  committ ed a
pa t t ern  of racket eer ing a ctivity  or  from wh en  the p la in t iff
discovered, or  sh ould  have d iscover ed , t he defen dan t ’s
pa t t ern?128
Jay Kelly Wr ight ,129 a  p ract i t ione r  wh o h as writ ten
exte ns ively on civil RICO, expla ins  th e int rica cies of this
ques t ion .130 “Th er e wa s a  tim e,” he wr ite s, “when  cert ain ty a nd
ease of app lica tion  wer e th e domin an t t hem es in  judicia l
de cis ion s app lyin g a  st a tu te of limit ations.”131 Th e limit a t ion s
periods began  to run  upon  commiss ion  of the a ct  caus ing  the
in ju ry, t hus  “i f you  had  su rge ry and  were sown  up with  medica l
waste st ill  in side , a  negl igence cla i m  accrued a t  the  t ime  of the
opera t ion ; if you did n’t lear n a bout  th e foreign  object un til after
the lim it a t ion s p er iod  had  run , tha t  was unfor tuna te , bu t  the
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135. Ha ckenbe rg,  supra  no t e 5 , a t  1413-14  & nn .15 -16 (citations omitted)
(“Accru al  re st s s olel y u pon  kn owle dge  of th e in ju ry  un de r t hi s r ul e.”).
136. Wr igh t , supra  note 37, at  14.
137. Kl eh r  v. A.O.  Sm it h C or p.,  117  S. C t.  198 4, 1 990  (199 7) (em ph as is om it te d).
138. S ee Zenith Ra dio Corp. v. Hazeltine Resea rch, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 328-29
(197 1).
139. Klehr, 117  S. C t.  at  199 1 (em ph as is a dd ed ).
140. S ee id . at  1994  (Sca lia , J ., con cu r r i n g in  pa r t  and  concur r ing in  the
judgmen t ) (“[T]he one clea r pa th  back ou t of the  curr ent  forest of confusion . . . is t he
pr oposi tion  tha t RICO is  similar to the Clayton Act.”).
claim  wa s t ime -bar re d n ever th eless .”132 Wr ight  t hen note s t ha t ,
“the seeming harshness of the ‘old’ ways cr eat ed pres sur e for
gre at er  flexibility; h en ce, we n ow ha ve ‘discover y’ pr inciple s.”133
Und er  discovery pr inciples , th e exam ple negligen ce claim wou ld
not  accrue  unt i l t he  pa t ient  discovered , or sh ould h ave
discovered, h is  in jury, i. e.,  tha t  he was s own  up w it h  med ica l
waste remaining inside. These discover y r u les  a re fa ct
inten sive, mor e difficult a nd  less  pr edict ab le, pr ompt ing Wr ight
to a dm it, “flexibility h as  come wit h a  pr ice.”134
Policy seems  to be the cr ucia l issue in th is question: Do we
want a  ha rsh , yet  predicta ble an d conven ient  ru le for civil
RICO or do we want  a  flexible, yet court -cum bersome r ule? The
“genera l fed er a l r u le” is  a  discover y r u le—“t he limit a t ion s
per iod begins to run  when a  plaint iff knows or  s h ou ld kn ow of
the ‘in ju ry which  i s the bas is for h is cau se of act ion.’”135 Bu t  the
an swer  to th is  RICO pol icy ques t ion  u lt im ately  “dep en d[s ] upon
what we exp ect p lain tiffs t o do dur ing t he  limit at ions p er iod.”136
The Cour t a voided t his  issu e in Klehr by assuming t ha t  the
par ties  were “kn owledgea ble.”137 However, it did cite a 1971
Cla yton  Act  de cis ion 138 i n  which  the  Supreme Cour t  he ld  tha t
an  antitr ust  claim accrued “when  those [an t it ru s t ] i nju r ie s
occurred” even though  such  a  ru le “wou ld  have left  the p la in t iff
without  re lief.”139 This  cita tion  could a rguably be in terp re ted  as
an  ar gumen t for adopting an  “occurren ce” ru le for RICO.
The Cour t’s citat ion sh ould n ot be s o cons tr ue d, h owe ver.
F i rs t , the on ly m em bers of t h e  Cou r t  who would adopt  the
Clayt on  Act  accrual  ru le want  to do so for  the  sake of
consist en cy, not for any m erits  of th e ru le.140 Second, it  is
impor tan t  t o r emember  tha t  t he C layton  Act  “occur r e n ce” rule
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141. O’Neill,  supra , note  5, at  215. See also id. a t  215-16 ( “Where  the  wrong
commi t t ed is eith er s elf-concealin g or act ively concealed by t he defendan t , [ the
f r audu len t concealment ] doctrine t olls the stat ute of limitations un til the p l a in t iff
d iscove r s or  sh ou ld h av e d isco ver ed  hi s in ju ry .”).
142. S ee id . at 213-215.
143. S ee Klehr, 11 7 S . Ct . a t 1 991  (“[A] hig h p er cen ta ge of c ivil RICO cases,
unl ike typica l an tit ru st ca ses, in volve frau d claim s.”); Sedima , S.P.R .L. v. Im rex C o.,
473 U. S. 4 79,  499  n. 16 (1 995 ) (cit in g A.B .A.  SE C T IO N  O F  CORPORATE , BAN K I N G  &
BU SI N E S S  LAW , RE P O R T O F  T H E  AD H OC CIVIL RICO  TASK F ORCE  55-56 (1985)); Blakey
& Cessa r, supra n ote 14, at 619 ap p. B (1987) (revealing th e resu lts of a study of 222
civil RI CO cl ai ms  in  th e ye ar s 1 985  an d 1 986 , wh ich  sh ows , on  av er ag e, 9 3.7 % of t he
cases involved fr au d “nat ur ed” claims ). 
144. Even  if it d id m ak e se ns e t o adop t an  accrual ru le that  different iated
between  frau dulen t a nd n onfra udu len t  a ctions , such  a r ule wou ld not com port  with
the Sup rem e Cour t’s rejection of th at  notion  in Malley-Duff. S ee Agency Hold ing Corp.
v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 148 (1987) (rejecting th e notion th at RICO
be as sign ed a  st at ut e of lim ita tion s a ccord ing  to t he  u n de r ly ing  na tu re o f t he
p redica t e acts  allege d in t he p ar ticula r RI CO claim ). 
145. Klehr, 117 S. Ct . at  1991 (citin g Sedim a, S.P .R.L. v.  Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479, 499 (1985). But see Malley-Duff, 48 3 U .S.  at  149  (“[A] n ot insignificant  num ber
of comp lai nt s a llege  crim ina l act ivit y of a t ype  gen er all y as socia te d wit h p rofessiona l
c r imina ls . . . . ”).
146. Klehr, 117 S. C t . a t  198 9-90  (exp la in in g t ha t i ns te ad  of pe rm it ti ng  pla in ti ffs
is su pple me nt ed by a  “doctr ine  of fra ud ule nt  concealm en t,” th e
p u r pose  of wh ich  is  “to p res er ve u ndiscover ed  cause s of a ct ion
un der  an  act -bas ed r ule .”141 Thus, if a Clayton Act defenda nt
conceals  h is  wr ong fr om a  Cla yt on Act p la in t iff, t he fr audu lent
concealmen t  doctrine tolls the sta tut e of limitations.142 Unl ike
the typ ical Cla yton  Act case , over n inet y percent  of RICO
causes of act ion  involve  fr aud  cl a ims143—th us  if a ru le sim ilar
to th e Clayt on Act ru le wer e ad opted  in a  RI CO  con t ext, these
cases would  oper at e a lmost  exclus ively with in t he  “except ion.”
There ar e simplicity concern s a t  play h er e; it  simply does  not
make sense t o adopt  a r ule w hen  an  exception  would r out inely
apply in nine out of ten cases.144 In deed , th e Cour t in  Klehr
noted  tha t  many  ci rcu i t s have a lr ea dy  app lie d d iscover y a ccrua l
ru les to RICO because those courts realize that  “most civil
RICO  claim s in volve [an ] un der lying fr au d offense .”145
Addit iona lly, wh at  litt le in dicat ion Congr ess  and the  Cour t
have give n  as t o wh a t  we  sh ould  exp ect  RICO pla in t iffs  to do
dur ing the limitations period should also persuade  us  to a pply a
“discovery” accru al r ule t o civil RICO’s  s ta tu te of l imi ta t ions
period. Al though  the Cour t  has  ind ica ted tha t  one  of civi l
RICO’s purposes was t o en cour age “pot en t ia l pr iva te p la in t iffs
diligen tly  to in vest igat e [th eir  righ ts ],”146 many commen t a tors
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t o “sleep[ ] on their rights,” the limitations period s h ou l d r eflect th e priva te a tt orne y’s
genera l nat ure of civil RICO as noted in  Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 151). An argum ent
could be m ad e t ha t,  comp ar ed t o an  “occurr ence” rule, a “discovery” rule provides a
dis in cent ive t o  engaging in a vigorous investigation. It must be rem embered tha t
cour t s will impute discovery to the time a r easonable plaintiff would have dis covered
th e in ju ry . Th is i mp ut ed  dis cove ry  pr act ice p re se rv es  th e p la in ti ff ’s incentive t o be
d il igen t , while the discovery rule gives the plaintiff an opportunity to investigat e and
ass emble  th e el em en ts  of a ve ry  comp lex ca us e of act ion.
147. O’Neill,  supra  note 5, at  239.
148. Som e comm ent at ors h ave n oted t he h eight ened  risk  of rule 11 sa nction s in
filing RICO cla ims . S ee Micha el Goldsm ith  & Mar k J ay Lin der ma n, Civil RICO
R eform : The Gatekeeper Concept, 43 VA N D. L. RE V. 735, 760 (1990 ) (citin g “Pr ofess or
Goldstock’s survey of 140 recent RICO cases in which rule 11 sanctions were
request ed sh ow[in g] t ha t j ud ges  im pos ed  sa nct ion s in  th ir ty -six  [of th ose ] cas es ”).
149. S ee P ub. L.  No.  91-4 52,  § 904 (a),  84 S ta t.  922 , 94 7 (19 70) (“ Th e pr ovisi ons
of th is t it le s ha ll b e li ber al ly con st ru ed  to e ffect ua te  it s r em ed ia l pu rp ose s.”).
150. Klehr, 117 S. Ct. at 1992.
151. Id .
152. Id .
have noted  tha t  a  civi l RI CO cause of act ion  “often  de velops
over tim e.”147 After d iscoverin g her  inju rie s and  even  a  pa t t ern
of ra cket eer ing a ctivity, a  RICO p lain tiff ma y st ill  need t ime  to
inve st igat e the conduct of the defenda n t  and  the na tu re  of the
racketee rin g ent erp ris e before sh e can  file her  claim. 148 An
“occurr ence” ru le would  th er efore often  wor k a n i nju stice to
civil RICO plaint iffs. And Congress a ffirm at ively directed t he
cour t s to “liberally const ru e” RICO ins tea d of limitin g its
app lica t ion .149 A “d is cove ry” r u le seems  to m ore fully comply
with  th e policies un der lying RICO an d should t her efore be
adopted by the court s.
3. Knowledge of the injury, of the source of injury, or of the
cau se of  act ion ?
 W h a t kin d of “discover y” ru le shou ld cour t s  apply? The
Cou r t  in Klehr wou ld  not  revi ew the E igh th  Cir cu it ’s
ap plicat ion of i t s “in ju ry p lus  sou rce  plus pa t t ern” d iscovery
ru le even th ough th e Klehrs  claimed th ey “lack ed  knowle dge of
the faulty silo—the ‘source’ of the ir in jur y.”150 The Supreme
Cour t  point ed ou t t ha t t he  Eigh th  Circu it’s ru le pr ovides a
“larger  hole” than  an  “in jur y plus pa tt ern  discovery” ru le.151 If
the Kleh rs  “[could  not ] fit th eir ca se th rough  the  Eigh th
Circu it’s larger  hole,” th e Court  wrote, “they [could  not ] squ eeze
it  th rough a  sma ller one.”152 Its geomet ric logic is sound, bu t t he
Cou r t  will event ua lly need to addr ess t hese issu es direct l y.
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153. Because th i s  Note  a rgues  tha t  a  civil  RICO ca us e of act ion s hou ld n ot r un
un til  discovery of injury and pat tern, it will not consider the “discovery of individual
p redica t e acts ” possibility. See supra  Pa rt  IV.B.1-2. 
154. Klehr, 117 S. Ct . at 1 988 (quotin g Klehr  v. A.O. Smith  Cor p., 87 F.3d 231,
238 (8t h C ir . 19 96)).
155. 444 U.S. 11 1 (1979). 
156. S ee Wrigh t, supra  no t e 37,  a t  16 . La ter ,  Wr ight qualifies his Ku bri ck
an alog y. Kubrick  was a per sonal injury case, Wright explains, wher e the
c ir cumstances for lenien cy “ma y be grea ter  th an  in cases involving financial loss
alon e.” Id .
157. S ee id .
158. S ee id .
159. Id .
Does the “discover y” ru le a ccrue a t  discovery of th e inju ry,
discovery of t he  in ju ry and  the sou rce  of the injury, or discovery
of the ca use  of act ion ?153
This  Note  a rgues tha t  the RICO s ta tu te of limit a t ion s
per iod shou ld accrue  upon  th e discover y, or im pu te d dis covery,
of the  in ju ry  and the sour ce of inju ry, bu t s hou ld not be delayed
un t il the discovery of the cause  of act ion . The s t a tu t e of
lim it a t ion s s hould  accrue a s s oon as t he p la in t iff “‘discove r [ed ],
or  reasonably should have discovered, both t he existen ce and
source of [her ] inju r y  a n d t h a t  t he  in ju ry [was] pa r t  of a
pa tt er n,’”154 bu t  a civil RICO defendent  should n ot ha ve to wait
for  th e pla int iff to discover her  injury is a ctionable before t he
stat ute of limitat ions accrues.
To expla in t his  issu e, J ay K elly Wrigh t  re fe r s  us  to the
Supreme Cour t’s decision  in U n i ted  S ta tes  v.  Ku br ick ,155 a case
in  which  the p la int iff suffered a  hea rin g loss th at  was  pr obably
caused by an  an t ib iot i c tha t  had  been  administered.156 Only
la ter  was  it r evea led t o th e pla int iff tha t h e ha d a  possible
negl igence cla im , be cause  the a n t ibiot ic t ha t  was adm inister ed
should not  ha ve been  given t o him .157 The Court  h eld tha t  the
s t a tu t e of limitat ions accrued upon kn owle dge of t he in ju ry  and
the cause of t ha t  in ju ry.158 “[I]t wa s u nn ecess ar y,” Wrigh t
s u m m arizes, “for  the  pla in t i ff a l so to know tha t  the cause [of
th e inju ry] const itu te d a n a ctiona ble wr ong.”159
The Kubrick  Cour t ’s decis ion  seem s t o en cour age p la in t iffs
to engage in  the sa me type of in ves t iga t ion  tha t  the Cour t
encoura ged for RICO pla int iffs in Klehr. The Cou rt  in Kubrick
wrote,  “If [the  pla int iff] fails  to br ing su it be cau se h e is
incompeten t ly or  mistaken ly  told tha t  he  does  not  ha ve a case,
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160. Ku bri ck , 444 U.S. at 124.
161. S ee d iscuss ion  supra  text a ccompa nying notes  150-53.
162. This  Note has tr ied to avoid using the term  “RICO inju ry” because  of  it s
am biguit y. The t erm  ma y refer  to th e individu al in j uries the pla intiff has suffered
tha t  were caused by th e defendant’s “predicate acts” or the injury th e pla in t i ff  has
suffered tha t was caus ed by the defendan t’s “pattern of racketeer ing activity.” The
RICO statu te, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), offers only minimal help. It allows  “[a]ny p er son
injured  in h is bu sin ess  or p rop er ty b y r ea son  of a viol at ion  of section 19 62 of this
chapte r” to s ue  for  re lie f. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994). See s u pra t ext  accompanying
notes  11-15 for a discu ssion of wha t const itu tes a  violati on  of § 1962. A “RICO
inju ry,” th en , r efe rs  to t he  in ju ry  re su lt in g fr om  a v iola ti on  of RICO. This includes
the in j u r ies ca us ed b y th e de fen da nt ’s pr edi cat e a cts , if th ose p re dica te  act s for m t ha t
de fendan t ’s pat ter n of ra ckete erin g activit y.
163. Kleh r v. A.O . Sm it h C or p.,  117  S. C t.  198 4, 1 992  (199 7).
164. Id .
we discer n  no sou nd r ea son  for  . . . d ela yin g t he a ccrua l of t he
claim  unt il t he p la in t iff is  other wise  in formed  or  h ims elf
deter mines  t o brin g su it . . . .”160 The Kubr ick  ana lysi s sugges t s
tha t  fu ll k nowle dge of a  RICO cause  of action will not be
requir ed  to st a r t  the limit a t ion s per iod ru nn ing.  This, however,
only disposes of the “knowled ge of the  cause of act ion”
possibilit y from  t h e initia l quest ion. The quest ion now becomes
wheth er  limit at ions p eriod a ccrua l sh ould begin  with
kn owledge  of injur y or wit h k nowled ge of th e inju ry a nd  th e
source of the  inju ry. Th e Klehr Cour t  cha ract e r ized  these two
ru le s a s  t he “sma ll er” an d t he  “lar ger  hole,” res pect ively.161 The
poin t that  the Court att empt ed to m ak e wit h t his  orifice
ana logy wa s t ha t , if t he d iscover y of the “sou rce of a n  in jur y”
has any e ffect  on  the is su e a t  a ll, i t  wil l be  to favor  the p la in t iff
by delaying the accrua l of the sta tu te of limitat ions because
discovery of t he  sou rce of an  in ju ry  wi ll  normal ly  occur  a ft e r  the
discover y of the  exist en ce of an in jur y.
W h a t is t he  sour ce of a RICO in jur y?162 The Klehr Cour t
made  th is  inqu iry because th e Klehrs claimed that th e source of
th eir  i nju ry was the  fau lty  s il o,  and  tha t  t he  E ig ht h  Circu it
sta rt ed the a ccrua l per iod  ea r lie r  than  it  sh ould  have—t he
Eighth  Ci rcu i t  concluded tha t  the  Klehrs  “shou ld reasonab ly
have discovered  th e silo’s flaw s before  1989.”163 The Supreme
Cou r t  avoided makin g its own factua l  de termina t ion  in  Klehr,
bu t noted  the “high ly fa ct -ba se d” n a ture of t he E igh th  Cir cuit’s
conclu sion .164 Th e low er  cour t ’s d et er min a t ion
d e p e n d [ ed ] n ot  on ly u p on  h ow  m u ch  m old  the  Kleh r s  no t i ced
in  the i r  s i l age  and  when ,  bu t  a l so  upon  su ch  m a t t er s  a s t h e
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165. Id .
166. S ee Wrigh t, supra  not e 37, a t 16. 
167. United  St at es  v. K ub ri ck,  444  U. S. 1 11,  124  (197 9).
168. This  Note  acknowledges  tha t  t he Klehrs  cla im tha t  they  on ly became
“sufficient ly suspicious” to investigate th e silo after 1991. See Klehr  v. A.O. Smith
Corp.,  117 S. Ct . 1984, 1988 (1997). But  th e Eigh th  Circuit  and Dis tr ict C our t fou nd
tha t  “th e Kle hr s sh ould  re as ona bly h ave  dis cover ed t he  silo’s fla ws  befo re  1989 ( and
tha t  a  r ea son abl e fact finde r  cou ld  not  con clude  to t he c on t ra ry).” Id. at  1992. 
effect  of t h e K leh rs ’ fai lu re  to con su lt t h e h er d p er form a n ce
r e c or d s  th ey w er e cont inu ous ly sen t, a nd  wh et he r t he ir h av ing
d on e  so would h ave led t hem  .  .  . to  que st ion H ar ves t o r e ’s
rep resen ta t ives  m ore  fu l ly ,  or  t o  inves t iga t e  the  s i l o  soone r .165
A “source  of i nju ry” det e rmina t ion  may seem ambiguous,
because  it is. The inqu iry, as described by t he Klehr Cour t ,
seems to be a  fact  in ten sive  ap plicat ion of “pa t t er n, ” “in jur y,”
and “p r edicate a cts.” As applied by the Kubrick  Cour t  in  a
negl igence conte xt, 166 t he  “source  of in jur y ” ru le would n ot t oll
the st a tu te of lim it a t ion s u n t il t he p la in t iff “dete rmines to b r ing
su it,” bu t  wou ld  pr eve nt  the s t a tu te fr om runnin g  u nt i l the
pla int iff “discovers . . . the r elevan t  fact s  abou t  [h i s] i nju ry. ”167
Clea rly,  there is a  wa y t o res olve th is  ambiguit y; t he key seems
to be d iscover y of facts  tha t  wil l be  rele va nt  to the p la in t iff ’s
in ju ry.
Given that  most civil RICO causes of action are fraud-based,
kn owledge  of th e “source” of an in jur y will us ua lly p rov ide fact s
re leva nt  to the exis t en ce of a n  i n ju ry  and a  pa t t ern  of
ra cket eer ing.  Fu rt her more, t he length  of tim e it t ak es a RI CO
pla int iff to d iscover  th e sour ce of he r  in jur y ma y depen d  on  the
dura t ion  and complexity of the defendant ’s pat ter n of fraud. In
Kleh r, t he plaint iffs alleged injur y was a  resu lt of Harvest ore’s
pa t t ern  of rack et eer ing a ctivit y, i.e., Ha rvestore ’s  p red ica t e act s
of fraud . The source  of the ir  in ju ry  was  the defect ive silo. The
Klehrs  would not  have d iscover ed  their  in ju ry a nd a  pa t t er n  of
fraudu len t act s 1 68 if t hey h ad n ot  a lso discover ed  the s ource of
th eir  injury—th at  th e silo did not keep oxygen away from the
feed. A cour t  mus t  t he refore t ake  the “source  of t he  in ju ry” into
consi der at ion wh en  de cid in g a t  wh a t  poin t  in  t im e it  sh ould
rea sona bly impute discovery of the existence of a n injury and a
pa t t er n  of ra cke teer in g t o a civil R ICO p la in t iff.
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169. S ee supra  no t e 145  and accompany ing  t ex t .
170. K l eh r, 117 S. Ct. at 1992. The Supreme Court also referred to this rule,
outside the discussion  of “s ou rce ,” a s the “i n ju ry a nd p a t ter n  di scov er y r u le .” See id.
a t  1988. This may suggest th at t he Court expects t he concept of “inju ry  and pa t t ern”
d iscove ry to include  a  con ce pt  of “s ou rce .” 
171. S ee O’Neill, supra  no te  5, a t 2 36 (“ To a dm ini st er  [O’Neill’s] pr oposed ru le
of accrual, the court would h ave to determ ine wheth er, tak en  toge the r , t he  p red ica te
ac ts pled in the complaint form a  patt ern a nd, if they do, when t hey first formed
on e.”).
172. Id . 
173. S ee Na tion al As socia tion  of Secu ri tie s a nd  Com me rcia l Law Att orne ys
(NASC AT) Amicus Brief at 8-9, Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 117 S. Ct. 1984 (1997)
T h e fact t ha t m ost civil RIC O claim s in volve an  un der lying
fraud offense,169 an d t he fa ct t ha t m ost RI CO pla int iffs will find
kn owledge  of the s our ce of th e inju ry r elevan t t o discovering
th eir  in ju ry  and the  de fendan t ’s  pa t t ern  of racke tee r ing, leads
th i s Note  to p ropose  tha t  cour t s  shou ld apply t o th e civil RICO
s ta tu t e of limit at ions a r ule simila r t o the “ ‘in ju ry p lu s s ource
p lus pa t t ern ’”170 ru le the C ou r t  discus sed in  Klehr. Be cause  of
the int e rel a ted na tu re of th e “sou rce of in ju ry” inqu ir y, a  cour t
imput ing reasonable discovery shou ld s ta r t  the l imi ta t ions
per iod  from the poin t i n t ime in w hich  th e pla int iff should  ha ve
rea sona bly discovered  bot h  the exis t en ce a nd t he source of t ha t
in ju ry  and tha t  the  in ju ry  was  par t  of a  pa t t ern .
4. Postpattern inju ries: separate accrual?
 Accord in g t o t he “last  pr edicat e act ” ru le it is  i nappropr ia t e
to st ar t t he lim ita tion s per iod before th e pa tt ern  of racket eer ing
is fully developed . The ru le proposed above, instead,  would run
the l imi t at ions  when  the  pa t t e rn  first develops.171 What  abou t
injur ies discove rable  bey ond t he poin t  of pa t t e r n  format ion?
One commenta tor  has  sugges t ed th at  “[t]he sta tu te of
lim it a t ion s on e ach in ju ry di scove rable  a fter  [the poin t of
pa t t er n  forma t ion  shou ld] commence  when  the  pl a in t iff
becomes  cha rgeable wit h k nowled ge of [tha t in jur y].”172 This
“sepa ra t e accrua l” p rov is ion  for  post pa tt ern  inju ries  would
complem ent  the  “in ju ry  and  p at t ern  discovery” ru le proposed
above.
Robert  Blak ey ar gue d t ha t a  pr ovisi on  like “separat e
accrua l” only muddies t he ea rlier  distinction this Note made
between  “injury discovery” ru le s and  “in ju ry p lus  pa t t e rn
discover y” rules.173 For  p repa t t ern  RICO in jur ies, accordin g to
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(No.  96-6 63).
174. Id . at 12.
175. Klehr, 117 S. Ct. at 1989.
176. Described supra  Pa rt  II.B.2. 
177. The same criticism can be app lied to the “injury” rule.
178. Described supra  Par t II.B.3.
179. Klehr, 117  S . C t . a t  1989. S ee also Unit ed Sta tes v. Kubr ick, 444 U.S. 111,
125 (1979) (“[S]tatut es of limita tions often ma ke it imp ossible t o en fo rce  what  were
otherwise perfectly valid claims. But tha t is their very purpo se,  and t hey  remain  as
ub iqu itous as  th e s ta tu tor y r igh ts  or ot he r r igh ts  to w hi ch t he y a r e a t t ached  or  a r e
ap pli cab le. ”).
the above “in ju r y plus p a t t er n  discover y” ru le,  the s t a tu te of
lim it a t ion s accru es  onl y wh en  the p la in t iff dis covers, or sh ould
have discovered, t he patt ern. For postpat tern RICO injuries,
the sta tu te of limita tions a ccru es when  th e plaint iff discovers,
or  shou ld have discovered , th e inju ry. Th e “injur y discover y”
ru le essentially applies a “separ at e accrua l” ru le to both  pre-
and postpa tt ern  RICO injuries. Blak ey argu es th at  an ytime a
cour t  ap plies a  “sepa ra te a ccrua l” ru le,  a  “mer itor ious pla int iff’s
RICO claim s a re  un jus tifia bly tim e-bar re d,”174 a s th e pla int iff
may not be able t o recover for  t h e  fu l l pa t t ern . Bu t  th i s Note
has asserted t h a t  a civil RICO claim is actionable wh en t he
patt ern first develops, not when it fully develops.
In  Klehr the Cour t  rejected  the “la st  pr ed ica te a ct” ru l e a nd
dismiss ed Blak ey’s cont ent ions a bout  a m erit orious pla int i ff
because  his r ule would “creat e[] a  limit at ions p eriod t ha t is
longer th an  Congress could have cont em pla te d.”175 The pr oper
accrua l rule wil l not  del ay the  runn ing of t he  st a tu t e  of
limit at ions u nt il th e pa tt ern  is “fully” developed, n or sh ould it .
Civil RICO pr ovides  a  rem ed y for  any in ju ry t ha t  a  pla in t iff
su ffe r s a s  a  r esu lt  of a  pa t t ern  of r ackete er ing a ctivit y,
regardless of whethe r  t ha t  in ju ry i s discover able  before or  a ft e r
the pa tt er n d evelops. T he  “inju ry d iscovery” ru le176 tr eat s pre-
and pos tpa t t er n  in ju r ies  the s ame, b u t  in  doing so, it  doe s n ot
account  for  the  un ique RICO pa t tern  e lement  and  thus
compromises RICO’s sta tu tor y rem edy. 177 The  “las t  p red ica t e
act ” ru le,178 tr eat s pr e- an d post pa tt ern  in ju r ies  the same,  bu t
in  doing so it  “crea tes  a lim itat ions period th at  is longer th an
Congress cou ld have contemplated” and compromises a
defendan t ’s p rocedural re pose.179 In  con t ras t , the  “in ju ry  plus
pa t t ern  discovery” ru le tha t  th is Note pr oposes bala nces
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180. S ee supra  Pa rt  IV.A.
181. Kleh r v. A.O . Sm it h C or p.,  87 F .3d  231 , 23 9 (8t h C ir . 19 96).
182. An  addit ional,  non-independent injury may affect other RICO considerations,
l ike recovery, for example, but such considerations lie beyond the scope of this  Note.
183. S ee K lehr, 87 F.3d at 239.
184. S ee supra  Par t IV.B.1.
185. Kleh r v. A.O . Sm it h C or p.,  117  S. C t.  198 4, 1 990  (199 7).
recovery and repose,180 by delaying, unt il the pa tt ern  element  is
first  sat isfied, the limita tions per iod accru al for prepa tt ern
injuries. But  an  “in ju ry  plus pat t e r n discovery” accrua l ru le
does not  ha ve to cons ider  post -pat te rn  inju rie s in  light  of th e
same pr in cipl es ; the pa t t ern  e lement  has already been satisfied.
After  the p a t t er n  fir st  de velops, t her e m ay be  add it ion a l
discover ab le in jur ies. At  th is poin t, a  cour t  applying the  “in ju ry
p lu s pa tt ern  discovery” ru le sh ould m ak e an  inqu iry, sim ilar  to
the Eighth Circuit’s, into the na tur e of the additional injury. Is
the post pa tt er n in jur y an  “ind epen den t in jur y,” i.e., one th at  is
pa r t of th e p a t tern  but  discovered  aft er t he p at ter n a nd  all
ot h e r elem ent s h ave fir st  become cognizable? Or  is t he
pos tpat t e rn in ju ry p ar t  of “on e sin gl e, con t in uou s in ju ry”? 181 If
it  is  not  in de pe nde nt , t he cou r t  has n oth in g t o consider  for
lim it a t ion s accrua l purposes.182 If it is  an  “ind epen den t in jur y,”
it  gene ra t es a sepa rat e cause of action tha t accrues upon
discover y of tha t in jur y.183
These “indepen dent  injury” and “sepa r a t e accru al”
prov is ions crea te a  hybr id  ru le for  postpa t t ern  in ju r ies , us ing
the Cla yt on  Act  mode l. This  Not e d iscar ded  the Clay ton  Act
ru le above 184 because tha t  ru le would have s ta r t ed  the
lim it a t ion s pe r iod in it ia lly  wit hout  account ing for civil RICO’s
pa t t ern  e lement .  But  a ft e r  the pa t t ern  e lement is  sa t is fi ed  and
the “in ju ry  plus pa t t ern” d iscovery rule has sta rted th e
lim it a t ion s clock, t he Cla yt on  Act  ana logy b ecom es  more
per t inen t . The Supreme Cour t  d id  note  that  “t he  Clayton  Act
ana logy is h elpfu l.”185 By addin g a  “sep ara te a ccrua l” pr ovis ion
to the “in ju ry p lu s p a t t er n” dis cover y r u le,  the Cla yt on  Act
ana logy helps the civil RICO limitat ions per iod  harmonize
RICO’s u n i qu e nat ure with st atu te of limitations principles. In
th i s way, the rule proposed in  th is Not e an swer s t he lin gerin g
quest ion—when does  the RICO s ta tu te of limit a t ion s
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186. Ju stice  Scalia refers to  t h e “vice of the ‘mix-and-match’ approach to statutes-
of-limi ta tion  borr owing.” Klehr,  117 S. Ct. at 1996 (Scalia, J., concurring in par t and
concur r ing in the judgm ent). The ma jority despised the label, noting rat her, th at t hey
recognized that “the Clayton Act’s express statute of limitations does not necessa rily
provide all t he a nsw ers .” Id . a t  1992.  One  ge t s  t he f ee ling t ha t  Jus t i ce s  Sca li a  and
Thomas, like Cin der ella’s wicked s tep -siste rs, w ould try to force another’s glass
slipper to fit  civil RI CO’s foot.
187. This  neces sita tes  an  “indepen den t in jur y” inquir y. S ee supra  text
accompany ing notes 181-83.
188. Agen cy Holdin g Corp. v. M al ley -Duff &  Ass ocs. , 48 3 U .S.  143 , 15 6 (19 87).
S ee also the Scalia-and-Thomas-Cinderella’s-wicked-step-sisters  a na logy supra no te
186.
accrue—and complet es  the fr amework se t  out b y the Malley-
Duff Cour t .186
V. CO N C L U S I O N
 Congress left  civil RICO “limita tions-na ked” when  it
ena cted th e st at ut e in 1 970, a nd , consequently, it  also failed to
delineat e a  p rope r  a ccrua l ru le . Al though  the  Supreme  Cour t
had two opp or tun i t ie s  to cons ider  th i s accrua l  is sue—once ,
when  it ga ve civil RICO th e four-yea r s ta tu te of limit at ions in
Malley-Duff , and again, more recently, when it rejected the
Th ird Circu it’s r ule in  Klehr— it h as  neve r comp let ely r e solved
it.  Th is  Not e h as a t t em pt ed  to fu lly  clot he civil RICO wit h a n
app ropria te st at ut e of limita tions a ccru al ru le.
A mor e ap pr opria te r ule w ould s ta rt  th e lim i t at ions  pe r iod
as soon  as t he pla int iff firs t d iscovers , or sh ould h ave
discovered, both  the exist en ce an d sou rce of her  inju ry a nd  th at
the injury is pa rt  of a pa tt ern  of ra cketeer ing. The ru le includes
a s epa ra te a ccrua l pr ovision for each  inju ry t ha t is  discovera ble
after  t he  poin t of pa t t ern  format i on. Th e court  ap plying t his
sepa ra t e a ccrua l provision, upon finding that th e injury is an
independen t one,187 should a ccru e a sepa ra te limit a t ion s p er iod
for  each  in ju ry from the  poin t t ha t  ad d it ional injury was
discoverable.
The pr oposed r ule p res erve s civil RICO r eme dies withou t
making its  four -year limita tions per iod impotent  an d, by
“ba lancing th e compet ing equ ities  un iqu e  t o civil RICO
actions,”188 i t  na tu ra lly completes the Supreme Court’s Malley-
Duff  and Klehr handiwork.
Marcus R . Mum ford
